The McCollum Memo:
The Smoking Gun of Pearl Harbor
On October 7, 1940, Lieutenant Commander Arthur McCollum of the Office of Naval Intelligence submitted a memo to Navy Captains Walter Anderson and Dudley Knox (whose endorsement is included in the following scans). Captains Anderson and Knox were two of President Roosevelt’s most trusted military advisors. The memo, scanned below, detailed an 8 step plan to provoke Japan into attacking the United States. President Roosevelt, over the course of 1941, implemented all 8 of the recommendations contained in the McCollum memo. Following the eighth provocation, Japan attacked. The public was told that it was a complete surprise, an “intelligence failure”, and America entered World War Two.
This memo, which proves that the government of the United States desired to lure Japan into an attack, was declassified in 1994. It took fifty years for the truth about Pearl Harbor to be revealed. Will we have to wait that long for the truth of 9-11 to come out? More about the Pearl Harbor Deception is at Pearl Harbor: Mother of all conspiracies (at least until 9/11) THE BONES OF STATION H The remains of the radio intercept station on Oahu that picked up Admiral Yamamoto’s order for the attack. YOUTUBE – THE BONES OF STATION H Video of the remains of the radio intercept station on Oahu that picked up Admiral Yamamoto’s order for the attack. |
The memo
0p-16-F-2 ON1 7 October 1940 Memorandum for the DirectorSubject: Estimate of the Situation in the Pacific and Recommendations for Action by the United States. 1. The United States today finds herself confronted by a hostile Germany and Italy in Europe and by an equally hostile Japan in the Orient. Russia, the great land link between these two groups of hostile powers, is at present neutral, but in al probability favorably inclined towards the Axis powers, and her favorable attitude towards these powers may be expected to increase in direct proportion to increasing success in their prosecution of the war in Europe. Germany and Italy have been successful in war on the continent of Europe and all of Europe is either under their military control or has been forced into subservience. Only the British Empire is actively opposing by war the growing world dominance of Germany and Italy and their satellites. 2. The United States at first remained coolly aloof from the conflict in Europe and there is considerable evidence to support the view that Germany and Italy attempted by every method within their power to foster a continuation of American 3. An examination of the situation in Europe leads to the conclusion that there is little that we can do now, immediately to help Britain that is not already being done. We have no trained army to send to the assistance of England, nor will we have for at least a year. We are now trying to increase the flow of materials to England and to bolster the defense of England in every practicable way and this aid will undoubtedly be increased. On the other hand, there is little that Germany or Italy can do against us as long as England continues in the war and her navy maintains control of the Atlantic. The one danger to our position lies in the possible 4. In the Pacific, Japan by virtue of her alliance with Germany and Italy is a definite threat to the security of the British Empire and once the British Empire is gone the 5. While as pointed out in Paragraph (3) there is little that the United States can do to immediately retrieve the situation in Europe, the United States is able to effectively nullify Japanese aggressive action, and do it without lessening U.S. material assistance to Great Britain. 6. An examination of Japan’s present position as opposed to the United States reveals a situation as follows: Advantages Disadvantages 1. Geographically strong position 1. A million and a half men of Japanese Islands. engaged in an exhausting war on the Asiatic Continent. A. Philippine Islands still held by the United States. 10. A consideration of the foregoing leads to the conclusion that prompt aggressive naval action against Japan by the United States would render Japan incapable of affording any help to Germany and Italy in their attack on England and that Japan itself would be faced with a situation in which her navy could be forced to fight on most unfavorable terms or accept fairly early collapse of the country through the force of blockade. A prompt and early declaration of war after entering into suitable 11. It is not believed that in the present state of political opinion the United States government is capable of declaring war against Japan without more ado; and it is barely possible that vigorous action on our part might lead the Japanese to modify their attitude. Therefore, the following course of action is suggested: A. Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of British bases in the Pacific, particularly Singapore. 12. If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better. At all events we must be fully prepared to accept the threat of war. A. H. McCollum 2. British naval control of the Atlantic prevents hostile action against the United States in this area. 3. Japan’s growing hostility presents an attempt to open sea communications between Japan and the Mediterranean by an attack on the British lines o communication in the Indian Ocean. 4. Japan must be diverted if British opposition in Europe is to remain effective. 5. The United States naval forces now in the Pacific are capable of so containing and harassing Japan as to nullify her assistance to Germany and Italy. 6. It is to the interest of the United States to eliminate Japan’s threat in the Pacific at the earliest opportunity by taking prompt and aggressive action against Japan. 7. In the absence of United States ability to take the political offensive, additional naval force should be sent to the orient and agreements entered into with Holland It is unquestionably to out general interest that Britain be not licked – just now she has a stalemate and probably can’t do better. We ought to make it certain that she at least gets a stalemate. For this she will probably need from us substantial further destroyers and air reinforcements to England. We should not precipitate anything in the Orient that should hamper our ability to do this – so long as probability continues. If England remains stable, Japan will be cautious in the Orient. Hence our assistance to England in the Atlantic is also protection to her and us in the Orient. However, I concur in your courses of action we must be ready on both sides and probably strong enough to care for both. |