

On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing *The Global Intelligence Files*, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

**The Art of Naming Operations**

Released on 2013-02-13 00:00 GMT

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Email-ID** | 905633 |
| **Date** | 2011-03-22 21:46:28 |
| **From** | **burton@stratfor.com** |
| **To** | **analysts@stratfor.com** |
| **List-Name** | **analysts@stratfor.com** |

[**http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/1995/sieminsk.htm**](http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/1995/sieminsk.htm)

GREGORY C. SIEMINSKI

------------------------------------------------------------------------

>From /Parameters/, Autumn 1995, pp. 81-98.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Shortly after word spread among key military leaders that President Bush
had ordered the invasion of Panama, Lieutenant General Thomas Kelly,
Operations Officer on the Joint Staff, received a call from General
James Lindsay, Commander-in-Chief (CINC), Special Operations Command.
His call did not concern some last-minute change in the invasion plan;
rather, it concerned a seemingly insignificant detail of the operation:
its name. "Do you want your grandchildren to say you were in Blue
Spoon?" he asked.[1] Lieutenant General Kelly agreed that the name
should be changed. After hanging up the phone, General Kelly discussed
alternatives with his deputy for current operations, Brigadier General
Joe Lopez.

"How about Just Action?" Kelly offered.

"How about Just Cause?" Lopez shot back.[2]

So was born the recent trend in nicknaming operations. Since 1989, major
US military operations have been nicknamed with an eye toward shaping
domestic and international perceptions about the activities they
describe.[3] Operation Just Cause is only the most obvious example of
this phenomenon. From names that stress an operation's humanitarian
focus, like Operation Provide Comfort in Turkey, to ones that stress an
operation's restoration of democratic authority, like Operation Uphold
Democracy in Haiti, it is evident that the military has begun to
recognize the power of names in waging a public relations campaign, and
the significance of winning that campaign to the overall effort. As
Major General Charles McClain, Chief of Public Affairs for the Army, has
recently written, "the perception of an operation can be as important to
success as the execution of that operation."[4] Professor Ray Eldon
Hiebert, in a piece titled, "Public Relations as a Weapon of Modern
War," elaborates on that view: "The effective use of words and media
today . . . is just as important as the effective use of bullets and
bombs. In the end, it is no longer enough just to be strong. Now it is
necessary to communicate. To win a war today government not only has to
win on the battlefield, it must also win the minds of its public."[5]

Like any aspect of operational planning, the job of naming operations
initially falls to mid-level staff officers in Defense Department
components, agencies, and unified and specified commands, to which the
Joint Chiefs of Staff have delegated considerable freedom in the naming
of operations. Because nicknames help determine the way operations are
perceived, joint staff officers must develop not only their skill as
operational artists but also their art as operation namers.

An appreciation for the art of doing anything is best gained from
practitioners, both good and bad. By way of offering a sort of
historical apprenticeship, this article reviews the origins and
development of the practice of naming operations, with particular
emphasis upon the American tradition which emerged from World War II.
This heretofore unchronicled story contains useful lessons for officers
who must recommend or approve an operation name.

\*Operations in the World Wars\*

Naming operations seems to have originated with the German General Staff
during the last two years of World War I. The Germans used code names
primarily to preserve operational security, though the names were also a
convenient way of referring to subordinate and successive operations.
Thus, it is probably no accident that operational names came into use at
the same time as the rise of operational art. It was simply easier to
get a handle on the complexities of operational sequencing and
synchronization by naming each operation something that the staff could
remember. The Germans chose names that were not only memorable but also
inspiring. Plans for the great Western Front offensive in the spring of
1918, which saw the most extensive use of operational code names,
borrowed from religious, medieval, and mythological sources: Archangel,
St. Michael, St. George, Roland, Mars, Achilles, Castor, Pollux, and
Valkyrie.[6] The selection of these names was perhaps an adjunct to
Ludendorff's patriotic education program, designed to stir a demoralized
and weary army into making one final push.[7] The original, stirring
vision conjured by these names was lost, however, when several of the
planned operations had to be scaled back. St. George, for example,
devolved to the uninspiring diminutive Georgette.[8]

The American military adopted code names during the World War II era,
primarily for security reasons.[9] Its use of code names for operations
grew out of the practice of color-coding war plans during the interwar
period.[10] Even before America entered the war, the War Department had
executed Operation Indigo,[11] the reinforcement of Iceland, and had
dubbed plans to occupy the Azores and Dakar as Operations Gray[12] and
Black[13] respectively.

With the outbreak of the war, the practice of using colors as code names
was overcome by the need to code-name not only a growing number of
operations, but also numerous locations and projects. The War Department
adopted a code word list similar in principle to one already in use by
the British. In early 1942, members of the War Plans Division culled
words from an unabridged dictionary to come up with a list of 10,000
common nouns and adjectives that were not suggestive of operational
activities or locations. They avoided proper nouns, geographical terms,
and names of ships.[14] Since so many operations would involve the
British, they made sure the list did not conflict with the one developed
and managed by their counterparts on the British Inter-Services Security
Board.[15] In March 1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the
classified Inter-Services Code-Word Index[16] and gave the War Plans
Division the duty of assigning code words.[17] Accordingly, the War
Plans Division (shortly afterward renamed the Operations Division)[18]
assigned blocks of code words to each theater; the European Theater got
such names as Market and Garden, while the Pacific Theater got names
like Olympic and Flintlock.[19]

Although the words listed in the British and American code indexes were
randomly chosen, the names of significant operations were thoughtfully
selected from the lists, at least those Winston Churchill had anything
to do with. Churchill was fascinated with code names and personally
selected them for all major operations.[20] He had clear ideas about
what constituted appropriate names. After coming across several that he
considered inappropriate, he went so far as to instruct an aide to
submit all future code names to him for approval; he dropped his demand
when he learned the magnitude of the task,[21] but he did take the
precaution of writing down some principles to guide his subordinates:

[1.] Operations in which large numbers of men may lose their lives
ought not to be described by code words which imply a boastful or
overconfident sentiment,. . . or, conversely, which are calculated
to invest the plan with an air of despondency. . . . They ought not
to be names of a frivolous character. . . . They should not be
ordinary words often used in other connections. . . . Names of
living people--Ministers and Commanders--should be avoided. . . .

2. After all, the world is wide, and intelligent thought will
readily supply an unlimited number of well-sounding names which do
not suggest the character of the operation or disparage it in any
way and do not enable some widow or mother to say that her son was
killed in an operation called "Bunnyhug" or "Ballyhoo."[22]

Borrowing a page from the Germans of World War I, whose code-naming
practices he knew well from writing his four-volume history of that
war,[23] Churchill saw the names of culturally significant figures as
useful sources of operational code words:

3. Proper names are good in this field. The heroes of antiquity,
figures from Greek and Roman mythology, the constellations and
stars, famous racehorses, names of British and American war heroes,
could be used, provided they fall within the rules above.[24]

Churchill's commonsense principles for naming operations influenced
American as well as British practice. For example, he objected to the
code name for the American bomber raid on the Romanian oil fields in
Ploesti because he thought the name "Soapsuds" was "inappropriate for an
operation in which so many brave Americans would risk or lose their
lives."[25] He aired his objections through the British Chiefs of Staff,
who persuaded the Joint Chiefs of Staff to change the name to the more
appropriate and inspirational Tidal Wave.[26] Churchill's hand also is
evident in the naming of many combined US-British operations, including
the American-led invasion of Normandy. The plan for the 1944 invasion
was originally Roundhammer, a combination of the code names for
invasions planned for previous years, Sledgehammer (1942) and Roundup
(1943).[27] While Churchill's personal response to the name Roundhammer
is not recorded, the British official history of the war calls the name
a "revolting neologism."[28] Whether this strong reaction was shared by
Churchill or not, he changed the name to Overlord,[29] deservedly the
best-known operational code name to emerge from World War II.[30] The
name suggests, as David Kahn has noted, "a sense of majesty and
patriarchal vengeance and irresistible power."[31] Whether or not
Churchill violated his own advice about avoiding names which imply
overconfidence, the name Overlord may well have strengthened the resolve
of those who planned the assault on fortress Europe.

The Axis powers also recognized the inspirational value of code names.
Although the Japanese typically numbered or alphabetically designated
their operations,[32] they resorted to inspirational names as their
strategic situation worsened, not unlike the Germans during World War I.
The Japanese offensive designed to thwart the Allied landings at Leyte
Gulf, for example, was optimistically dubbed Operation Victory.[33]

The Germans made extensive use of code names for plans and operations
and usually chose names at random; however, major operations often got
special consideration by the German leadership.[34] Perhaps the most
well-known example of this is the code name for the 1941 invasion of the
Soviet Union. Initially, the operation was christened Fritz, after the
son of the plan's author, Colonel Bernhard Von Lossberg.[35] But Hitler
would not have his grand project named something so pedestrian,
Lossberg's sentimental attachment notwithstanding. On 11 December 1940
he renamed the operation Barbarossa, the folk name of the 12th-century
Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I, who had extended German authority over
the Slavs in the east and who, legend said, would rise again to
establish a new German Empire.[36] In selecting a name with these
inspirational associations, Hitler risked revealing his intentions--the
very thing code names are designed to conceal. In the case of
Barbarossa, Hitler seems to have been lucky; in the case of Operation
Sealion, his planned invasion of Britain, he was not. British
intelligence divined Sealion's target from its telltale name.[37]

\*Using Nicknames to Shape Perceptions\*

The efforts of Hitler and Churchill notwithstanding, World War II
operation names had limited effect on shaping attitudes because they
were classified until after the war ended.[38] Thus, their effect on
troop morale was limited to those with clearances, and their effect on
public perception was delayed until after the war, at which point the
names were merely historical curiosities.

But in America, shortly after the war ended, the War Department decided
to use operation names for public information purposes in connection
with atomic bomb testing. To this end, the War Department created a new
category of unclassified operation names, which are known as nicknames
to distinguish them from classified code words. Code words are assigned
a classified meaning and are used to safeguard classified plans and
operations, while nicknames are assigned unclassified meanings and are
used for administrative, morale, and public information purposes.[39]

Nicknames offered new possibilities for shaping attitudes about
operations, and the first person to make use of one took full advantage
of the potential. Vice Admiral W. H. P. Blandy, the commander of the
joint task force conducting the 1946 atomic bomb tests on Bikini Atoll,
selected the nickname Operation Crossroads with great care. He chose it,
he told a Senate committee, because of the test's possible
significance--"that seapower, airpower, and perhaps humanity itself . .
. were at the crossroads."[40] Admiral Blandy was especially proud of
the name, and when he discovered that the word was already assigned to
another activity, he pulled strings to get it assigned to the Bikini
tests.[41]

The press publicized not only the name, but also Blandy's rationale for
selecting it, and did so with general approbation.[42] Commenting on
Blandy's public relations savvy, one historian wrote: "The choice of
names was brilliant, implying to some that the military was unsure of
its direction and was truly in awe of the atomic bomb."[43] However,
some in the press were not so enamored with Blandy or his choice of
name. In an article lampooning Blandy, /The New Yorker/ commented with
unmistakable sarcasm that the name "has been greatly admired in literary
and non-violent circles."[44] The sarcasm seems to suggest that while
the general public might admire the name, literary and non-violent
audiences were not taken in by Blandy's public relations methods. This
would not be the last time members of the media would resent the
military's success in popularizing a carefully chosen nickname.

\*Operations in Korea\*

Although the military had learned the value of well-chosen nicknames
during the peacetime atomic bomb tests, it continued to use meaningless
code names during wartime to protect operational security. At least this
was true early in the Korean War. In planning the Inchon landing,
General Douglas MacArthur and his subordinates followed the World War II
practice of selecting operation names from an established code word
list. The earliest plan was dubbed Operation Bluehearts, and the one
actually executed was Operation Chromite.[45]

MacArthur did depart from World War II practice in one important
respect: he permitted code names to be declassified and disseminated to
the press once operations had begun, rather than waiting until the end
of the war.[46] Thus, combat operation names were, for the first time,
public knowledge as operations unfolded. Curiously, MacArthur, with all
his public relations savvy, failed to see the opportunities this offered
for shaping perceptions.

China's intervention in the Korean War helped Lieutenant General Matthew
Ridgway see what MacArthur had not. Ridgway took command of the Eighth
Army as it was reeling southward under relentless Chinese attack. His
first task, he realized, was to restore the fighting spirit of his badly
demoralized command.[47] One way he did this was by giving decidedly
aggressive nicknames to the series of counteroffensives undertaken from
February to April 1951: Thunderbolt, Roundup, Killer, Ripper,
Courageous, Audacious, and Dauntless. Because these names were not
classified once operations began, they were widely disseminated among
Eighth Army soldiers to boost morale.[48] Ridgway's unprecedented use of
meaningful combat operation names set the tone for one of the most
remarkable transformations of any military organization in history. The
reinvigorated Eighth Army pushed the Chinese back to the 38th parallel.

If Ridgway's names contributed to success on the battlefield, they were
not nearly so successful on the home front. Ridgway had publicly
announced not only the start of his first major counteroffensive, but
also its nickname: Operation Killer.[49] In doing so, he may have
imagined that he could boost the morale of the public in the same way he
hoped to inspire his troops. After all, the news from the front had been
bad for months--so bad, in fact, that the US Far East Command had
suspended communiques dealing with operational matters the previous
fall.[50] It was probably no coincidence that the communiques resumed
the day after the start of Operation Killer.[51] Certainly some of
Ridgway's troops thought that Killer and other names had been chosen
with the media in mind.[52]

In any event, more than a few observers objected to Ridgway's operation
name, which was prominently displayed in many newspaper and magazine
articles.[53] One critic was the Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton
Collins, who informed Ridgway that "the word `killer' . . . struck an
unpleasant note as far as public relations was concerned."[54] Certainly
public relations suffered: several writers criticized the name directly
or implicitly in letters to /The New York Times/;[55] the International
Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union issued a report in which the
name served as the rubric for the entire conflict, which it called a
"phony" war emergency;[56] Republicans pointed to the term as evidence
that the Truman Administration had no other aim in Korea but to kill
Chinese;[57] and the State Department objected that the name had soured
negotiations with the People's Republic of China.[58]

While the incident taught Ridgway "how varied . . . the political
pressures [can be in waging] . . . a major war,"[59] he remained
unrepentant about his selection of the name: "I am not convinced that
the country should not be told that war means killing. I am by nature
opposed to any effort to `sell' war to people as an only mildly
unpleasant business that requires very little in the way of blood."[60]
However opposed his nature may have been to soft-pedaling the realities
of war, operations after Killer and its immediate successor, Ripper,
were given less bloody names.

\*Operations in Vietnam\*

Early in the Vietnam War, operations were often given nicknames
descriptive of the missions they designated. For example, a combined US
Marine and South Vietnamese operation designed to increase the area of
control of the Marine enclave at Da Nang was dubbed Blastout.[61] The
names of air operations in early 1966 suggest the widening of the air
war against North Vietnam. The two retaliatory air strikes against
carefully selected North Vietnamese installations were known as Flaming
Dart I and II, while the gradually escalating strategic bombing effort
begun shortly thereafter was known as Rolling Thunder.[62]

The penchant for giving descriptive names to operations in Vietnam
caused the military to relearn the lesson of Operation Killer. On 25
January 1966, the 1st Cavalry Division began a sweep operation through
the Bong Son Plain which it had dubbed Masher,[63] presumably because
the operation envisioned the enemy being mashed against a second force
comprised of Marines.[64] Owing to the media's free access to military
units and the lack of censorship during the war, nicknames like Masher
were frequently reported by the media as operations progressed. And
because Masher was a major operation conducted by the novel "airmobile
cavalry" division, it attracted a fair degree of media attention,
causing the name to be widely circulated on television and in the print
media.[65] When President Johnson heard it, he angrily protested that it
did not reflect "pacification emphasis."[66] General William
Westmoreland put it more bluntly when he speculated that "President
Johnson . . . objected . . . because the connotation of violence
provided a focus for carping war critics."[67] To remove their focus,
the division commander quickly renamed the operation White Wing.[68]

The lesson of the Masher incident was not lost on Westmoreland: "We
later used names of American cities, battles, or historic figures [for
operations]."[69] Indeed, reading the names of operations mounted in
Vietnam after February 1966 is like reading a cross between a gazetteer
and a history book.[70] Names such as Junction City, Bastogne, and
Nathan Hale were imbued with American associations and values, and thus
were politically safe, as well as potentially inspirational.

Like Ridgway, Westmoreland tried his own hand at the art of operational
naming. Also like Ridgway, he did so to inspire demoralized soldiers. In
early 1968, the garrison of 6000 US and South Vietnamese troops at Khe
Sanh found itself surrounded by an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 North
Vietnamese regulars. Many critics saw a Dien Bien Phu in the making, and
the beleaguered troops could not but be infected by the prevailing sense
of doom. To combat their dispiriting mood, Westmoreland named the
round-the-clock bombing and shelling of enemy positions Operation
Niagara. He selected the name, he said, "to invoke an image of cascading
shells and bombs," an image obviously designed to reassure the Khe Sanh
garrison.[71]

As the Vietnam War drew to a close, the Department of Defense for the
first time issued guidelines concerning nicknaming operations.[72] It is
clear from reading the guidelines--which remain in force today[73]--that
its authors learned well the lessons of Operations Killer and Masher.
Noting that improperly selected nicknames "can be counterproductive,"
the regulation specifies that nicknames must not: "express a degree of
bellicosity inconsistent with traditional American ideals or current
foreign policy"; "convey connotations offensive to good taste or
derogatory to a particular group, sect, or creed"; "convey connotations
offensive to [US] allies or other Free World nations"; or employ "exotic
words, trite expressions, or well-known commercial trademarks."[74] The
regulation further stipulates that a nickname must consist of two words
(which helps distinguish it from a code word, which consists of only
one) and requires the JCS to establish procedures for DOD components to
nominate and report nicknames.[75]

\*Post-Vietnam Automation\*

In 1975, the JCS implemented these guidelines by establishing a computer
system to fully automate the maintenance and reconciliation of
nicknames, code words, and exercise terms.[76] The computer system,
called the Code Word, Nickname, and Exercise Term System (an unwieldy
name shortened to NICKA), is still in operation today and can be
accessed through the Worldwide Military Command and Control System. The
NICKA system is not, as some assume, a random word generator for
nicknames; it is, in fact, merely an automated means for submitting,
validating, and storing them. The authority to create nicknames rests
not with those who manage the NICKA system, but with 24 DOD components,
agencies, and unified and specified commands.[77] JCS assigns each of
these organizations a series of two-letter alphabetic sequences and
requires that the first word of each two-word nickname begin with a
letter pair from one of the sequences.[78] For example, the US Atlantic
Command (USACOM) is assigned six two-letter alphabetic sequences: AG-AL,
ES-EZ, JG-JL, QA-QF, SM-SR, and UM-UR.[79] Selecting the letter pair UR
from the last of these sequences, a staff officer recommended the
nickname Urgent Fury for the 1983 invasion of Grenada.

Clearly, staff officers in DOD components, agencies, and unified and
specified commands have considerable freedom in creating nicknames,
certainly far more than their Vietnam-era predecessors. There is, and
has been for 20 years, plenty of room for artistry in naming operations.

In the first 15 years of the new system's existence, however, there was
little attempt to exploit the power of nicknaming to improve either
troop morale or public and international relations. Nicknames used from
1975 through 1988 were generally meaningless word pairs similar to the
operation names used during World War II: Eldorado Canyon (the 1986
Libya raid), Praying Mantis (the 1988 air strikes targeting Iranian
naval vessels and oil platforms), and Golden Pheasant (a 1988 show of
force to deter Nicaraguan violations of Honduran territory). When
nicknames were chosen purposefully, as in the case of Urgent Fury, the
effect was overdone.[80] Undoubtedly, the staff officer who came up with
"Urgent Fury" was intent on inspiring the troops executing the mission,
but he failed to consider the reaction of the media and general public.
The name, which was divulged to the press shortly after the
invasion,[81] only fueled the arguments of critics who accused the
military of excess in committing so much combat power to the
operation[82]--which, one wag suggested, "the New York Police Department
could have won."[83] Another critic implied that the name belied the
rationale for the invasion. Urgent Fury sounded "too militant," he
suggested; if we had really been provoked into invading the tiny island
nation, then why not "Reluctant Necessity"?[84]

Undoubtedly one reason for the military's failure to use operation names
to improve public relations was the strained relationship that existed
between the military and the media during this 15-year period. Many in
the military blamed the loss of the Vietnam War on the media's critical
reporting, which, it was argued, soured the American public's will to
continue the fight. Nowhere is this attitude toward the media more
evident than in Urgent Fury, where Vice Admiral Metcalf initially
refused to allow the media access to the combat zone. The motive for
this restriction was transparent:

Shutting the press out of Grenada was . . . based on a fear that an
unrestrained press might muck things up again as many senior leaders
believed they had done in Vietnam. If the press [was] not present,
then there [was] no need to be concerned about . . . media spin.[85]

Given such prevailing attitudes, it is small wonder that the staff
officer who came up with the name Urgent Fury failed to consider the
media's response to the nickname, much less use a name calculated to
create a positive response to the event. That the media could be used to
develop public support for operations was a notion foreign to many in
the military at the time.

\*Just Cause--or High Hokum?\*

Just Cause was the first US combat operation since the Korean War whose
nickname was designed to shape domestic and international perceptions
about the mission it designated. And it is perhaps unsurprising that the
man who helped formulate the name, Lieutenant General Kelly, held an
undergraduate degree in journalism.[86] His background equipped him to
appreciate what others could not: that naming an operation is tantamount
to seizing the high ground in waging a public relations campaign. By
declaring the Panama invasion a just cause, the nickname sought to
contrast US motives with the injustices of the Noriega regime, which
included election fraud, drug trafficking, harassment of US service
members and their dependents, and the murder of a Marine officer. The
gambit largely succeeded. The name, prominently mentioned in Pentagon
press releases, was widely circulated by the media, which generally
accepted the term without protest.

Network news anchors adopted the phrase "Operation Just Cause" to
refer to the invasion as if they had invented the phrase. In less
than an hour after the Bush administration started using the phrase
"Operation Just Cause," the network news anchors were asking
questions like "How is Operation Just Cause going?"[87]

At least two editorials adopted the phrase by way of endorsing the
invasion.[88]

Naming the operation Just Cause was risky, however, not only because it
was an obvious public relations ploy, but also because it apparently
sought to preempt judgment about whether, in fact, the invasion really
was moral, legal, and righteous. Some saw this as overreaching. A /New
York Times/ editorial entitled "Operation High Hokum" noted how
different the nickname was from previous nonsense names and criticized
it as an "overreach of sentiment."[89] Several years later, a more
spirited critic wrote:

It was an extremely cynical gambit to name a blatantly unjust
invasion Operation Just Cause. It betrayed the administration's
insecurity about an illegal invasion of a sovereign country. The
label was, therefore, very important . . . in creating the
impression among the general population that the US government was
pursuing a morally righteous cause. [It was] blatant propaganda.[90]

"Just Cause" illustrates both the power and the limits of nicknames in
shaping perceptions about military operations. Few would object to the
Defense Department engaging in what some have called "public
diplomacy"[91]--the attempt to portray its activities in a positive
light to bolster troop morale and to garner domestic and international
support. Commercial firms carefully consider product names to ensure
success in the marketplace; why should the government's approach to
naming military operations be any different? But there is a point at
which aggressive marketing turns public relations into propaganda. Going
beyond this point breeds cynicism rather than support. Precisely where
this point is may be ill-defined, but the nickname Just Cause probably
came close to it.

Operation Just Cause ushered in a new era in the nicknaming of US
military operations, one in which operations are given names carefully
selected to shape perceptions about them. To fully understand what
spawned this new era, one must look beyond the immediate influence of
Operation Just Cause. While the Panama invasion certainly helped
military leaders recognize how powerful nicknames could be in shaping
attitudes, two other important trends were at work.

The first trend was the growing recognition among the military
leadership that the media could be an ally rather than an opponent in
the public relations effort. Articles arguing for cooperation with the
media abound in professional military journals after 1989.[92] If
nicknames were to contain a message, then the media would be a useful
means of communicating it.

The second trend was the growing relative importance of nicknames in
relation to the shrinking scale of military action. During previous wars
like Korea and Vietnam, individual operations were but a small piece of
a much larger effort, so operation nicknames attracted relatively little
attention. In recent times, when wars are fought with unprecedented
speed and when circumscribed peacekeeping, humanitarian, and relief
missions proliferate, a single operation usually encompasses the entire
event. The Persian Gulf War is an exception, but even in that case the
confrontation consisted of only two operations. Nicknames have become
synonyms for entire conflicts; "Desert Storm," for example, is
frequently used in place of "Gulf War."[93]

\*Desert Shield to Sea Angel\*

In August 1990, the Central Command (CENTCOM) staff expended
considerable effort in selecting the best name for the operation
designed to defend Saudi Arabia from Iraqi invasion. The fact that so
much effort went into naming Desert Shield suggests the radical change
in attitude which had occurred in the nine months since the invasion of
Panama, when the transformation of the name Blue Spoon into Just Cause
occurred as an afterthought shortly before the operation began. The
naming of Operation Desert Shield and its successor, Desert Storm, also
illustrates the critical role of artistry in the process.

During the hectic days of planning the deployment to the Gulf, CENTCOM
staff officers managed to compile a list of candidate nicknames three
pages long,[94] from which General H. Norman Schwarzkopf initially
selected the name Peninsula Shield. The first two letters of the first
word, PE, are not assigned to CENTCOM, so it is clear that CENTCOM felt
that selecting the right name was more important than sticking to its
assigned alphabetic sequences. However, the JCS rejected the name,[95]
perhaps because the mission called for defending only portions rather
than the entirety of the Arabian Peninsula, or because "peninsula" was
not thought to be characteristic enough of the region. Other names were
considered, including Crescent Shield--a name intended to appeal to the
Saudis and other Arab allies--but this too was rejected.[96] In the end,
CENTCOM proposed and JCS accepted Desert Shield,[97] a name which
suggested both the region's characteristic geography and CENTCOM's
defensive mission.[98] The metaphor of the shield was well chosen
because it emphasized not only US deterrence but also Iraqi aggression,
for a shield is only necessary when a sword has been unsheathed. In the
context of the metaphor, the deployment of US troops was necessary to
deter an Iraqi sword that had already bloodied itself in Kuwait. Such
careful and effective wordsmithing played well with domestic and
international observers, setting a context conducive to garnering
support for the operation.

The naming of the offensive phase of the Gulf campaign was no less
effective. Recognizing the success of the nickname Desert Shield,
General Schwarzkopf played off the name in coming up with Desert
Storm,[99] establishing a thematic linkage which would later be employed
in subsequent and subordinate operations as well: the name of the ground
offensive was Desert Saber; the redeployment was called Desert Farewell;
the distribution of leftover food to the US poor was Desert Share. This
family of operation names drew grudging admiration from /The Nation/:
"You have to admire the Defense Department P.R. people who thought up
the names for the various phases of the war, each carefully calibrated
to send the correct propaganda message."[100] Characterizing the names
as propaganda is a cynical label which could be applied to any
government-sponsored public relations effort, but, for all its cynicism,
the comment does suggest how successful CENTCOM's operation names were
in developing public support for its various missions.

General Schwarzkopf was probably inspired to use the storm metaphor by
the name of the air operation, which Air Force planners had dubbed
Instant Thunder.[101] The storm metaphor associated the offensive with
the unleashing of overwhelming natural forces, an association which was
as politically astute as it was inspirational, cloaking the military
offensive in the garb of natural phenomena. When the long-awaited
offensive began, General Schwarzkopf played upon the metaphor's
inspirational power in his message to his troops: "You must be the
thunder and lightning of Desert Storm," he told them.[102] The General's
statement was widely publicized and admired; one writer commented that
Schwarzkopf's rhetoric "sounded positively Churchillian."[103] Thus, the
name served to inspire the nation as well as the troops.

Not all post-Just Cause nicknames have been as successful as Desert
Shield and Desert Storm. For example, the name for the US Marine
operation to aid victims of the 1991 typhoon which devastated Bangladesh
was originally Operation Productive Effort, a name that General Colin
Powell admitted he never liked and which neither he nor his staff could
remember. "After a day of struggling with Productive Effort, I said to
my staff, `We've just got to get a better name.'" When the following
day's newspaper reported that the Bangladeshis who saw the Marines
coming in from the sea by helicopter and landing craft said, "Look!
Look! Angels! From the sea!" the operation was rechristened Sea Angel.[104]

\*Guidelines for Naming Operations\*

The Productive Effort incident demonstrates that the military still has
some learning to do about the art of naming operations. Rules for
helping staff officers through the process would be of little value
because nicknaming is an art rather than a science. Yet four general
suggestions emerge from the last 45 years of nicknaming operations: make
it meaningful, target the key audiences, be wary of fashions, and make
it memorable. These suggestions and the prudent guidelines already
published in DOD Regulation 5200.1-R may prevent another
"(non)Productive Effort."

/First, make it meaningful/. Don't waste a public relations opportunity,
particularly where highly visible operations are involved. If the Gulf
War has taught us anything, it has shown us how powerful words and
images can be in shaping perceptions. But in the pursuit of a meaningful
name, avoid those that border on the propagandistic. It is one thing to
name an operation with a view to gaining public support first; it is
quite another to put a label on an operation that insists upon its
morality. However righteous an operation might appear to be, a name like
Just Cause can be distasteful to the media and general public, not
necessarily because they disagree with the justness of the cause, but
because they resent having such words put (literally) in their mouths.
The more prudent course is to find names that reinforce policy
objectives by emphasizing the mission and its rationale. Such an
approach is likely to satisfy all critics except those who view /any/
government public relations effort as propaganda.

/Second, identify and target the critical audiences/. While it has been
pointed out that "in the global media environment, the information
provided to one audience must be considered available to all
audiences,"[105] it is seldom possible to effectively target all
potential audiences using a two-word nickname. Thus, one must chose
one's target carefully. The first impulse might be to consider only the
morale of the troops and the support of the American public, but two
other audiences should be considered as well: the international
community, including allies and coalition partners; and the enemy.

The importance of these audiences varies with the situation. Where an
operation poses safety concerns to a foreign population, the operation
name should be designed to allay those concerns. For example, the
operation to remove chemical weapons from Europe was named Steel Box, "a
solid, positive name" which "implied leakproof execution, thus
reassuring our allies."[106] Where US forces operate with coalition
partners or allies, the operation may benefit from a name that
emphasizes solidarity. We routinely use such a strategy in naming
combined exercises like Team Spirit, and we sometimes elect to downplay
US participation by employing the language of the partner nations, like
Fuertes Unitas (United Forces).

In certain situations, even the enemy can be the critical audience,
since operation and exercise names can send clear signals of US
intentions. For example, Earnest Will was the name of the operation to
escort reflagged oil tankers through the Persian Gulf, a name which
conveyed to the Iranians the firmness of US resolve in defending the
vessels. An amphibious exercise mounted before the Gulf War was dubbed
Imminent Thunder, a name clearly designed to intimidate the Iraqis.

/Third, be cautious of fashions/. Operation nicknames enjoy periods of
popularity just like personal names. The current fashion in nicknaming
operations is to make the names sound like mission statements by using a
verb-noun sequence: Promote Liberty, Restore Hope, Uphold Democracy,
Provide Promise. ("Provide" is the most popular verb, having been used
in the names of six different operations during the 1989-1993
period.[107]) There is value in this approach because it tends to keep
the mission foremost in the minds of the troops executing it, and it
reminds domestic and international audiences why the mission was
undertaken. But there is also a certain formulaic monotony about such
names which makes them less memorable than they might otherwise be. Like
having a 1950s classroom full of Dicks and Janes, it's hard to tell the
Provide Hopes and Comforts apart.

/Finally, make it memorable/. To shape perceptions, nicknames must gain
currency, something that can happen only if they cling to the cobwebs of
the mind. This was one failing of the name Productive Effort; if the
Joint Staff couldn't even remember it, how would it affect the general
public? The name had three strikes against it: it lacked uniqueness (all
operations are efforts, and one hopes that all are productive); it was
abstract (what is a productive effort anyway?); and it was too long
(five syllables).

To avoid these failings, start by identifying unique attributes of the
operation. Try to capture those characteristics in specific terms with a
metaphor or with words that evoke an image. Try to keep each word to two
syllables or less. Sea Angel, the name that replaced Productive Effort,
has all the traits of a memorable name: it is unique and specific; it
evokes a clear image in more than one culture; and it has only three
syllables. Desert Shield and Desert Storm share those traits. It is no
accident that the latter name is so frequently substituted for the name
Gulf War. People remember it.

Applying the four guidelines will result in an effectively nicknamed
operation, an outcome that can help win the war of images. In that war,
the operation name is the first--and quite possibly the decisive--bullet
to be fired. Mold and aim it with care.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

\*NOTES\*

1. I have discarded the American typographic convention of capitalizing
operation names in the their entirety on the assumption that this would
be distracting in a paper full of such names. (As a general rule, it is
likewise the typographic house style of /Parameters/ to capitalize only
the first letter of operation names. In addition to being "distracting,"
the practice of setting operation names in all capitals--while
historically accurate--can be confusing, making them appear as acronyms.
Our choice in this matter has been for clarity over strict historical
accuracy, despite the objection of some of our historian advisors.--Editor)

2. Bob Woodward, /The Commanders /(New York: Pocket Star Books, 1991),
pp. 149-50.

3. For a comprehensive listing of nicknamed operations over the
five-year period starting in 1989, see Francis M. Doyle, Karen J. Lewis,
and Leslie A. Williams, /Named Military Operations from January 1989 to
December 1993/ (Fort Monroe, Va.: TRADOC Technical Library, 1994).
Nicknames and code words are not the same. As noted later in this
article, code words are assigned a classified meaning and are used to
safeguard classified plans and operations, while nicknames are assigned
unclassified meanings and are used for administrative, morale, and
public information purposes.

4. Charles W. McClain, Jr., and Garry D. Levin, "Public Affairs in
America's 21st Century," /Military Review/, 74 (November 1994), 11.

5. Ray Eldon Hiebert, "Public Relations as a Weapon of Modern Warfare,"
in /Desert Storm and the Mass Media/, ed. Bradley S. Greenberg and
Walter Gantz (Cresskill, N.J.: Hampton Press, 1993), p. 36.

6. Barrie Pitt, /1918: The Last Act/ (New York: W. W. Norton, 1962), pp.
47-50.

7. Robert B. Asprey, /The German High Command at War: Hindenburg and
Ludendorff Conduct World War I/ (New York: William Morrow, 1991), pp.
340-41.

8. Ibid., pp. 392-93.

9. Memorandum from Dwight D. Eisenhower to the Adjutant General,
Subject: Code Words to Designate Plans, Projects, Localities, etc., 10
March 1942, National Archives Record Group Number 407, p. 1.

10. Ray S. Cline, /United States Army in World War II: Vol. IV, The War
Department: Part 2, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division/
(Washington: GPO, 1951), p. 65, n. 59.

11. Mark Skinner Watson, /United States Army in World War II: Vol. IV,
The War Department: Part 1, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and
Preparations/ (Washington: GPO, 1950), pp. 487-90.

12. Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, /United States Army in World War
II: Vol IV, The War Department: Part 3, Strategic Planning for Coalition
Warfare, 1941-1942/ (Washington: GPO, 1953), p. 50, n. 67.

13. Ibid., p. 103, n. 22.

14. Bill Hines, "Operation CODENAME," /Infantry Journal/, March 1947, p.
42.

15. Ibid.; on the code-naming functions of the Inter-Services Security
Board, see the following sources: Ewen Montagu,/Beyond Top Secret Ultra/
(New York: Coward, McCann, and Geoghegan, 1978), p. 52; F. H. Hinsley
and C. A. G. Simkins, /British Intelligence in the Second World War:
Vol. IV, Security and Counter-Intelligence/ (New York: Cambridge Univ.
Press), p. 247.

16. Minutes of the Sixth JCS Meeting, 18 March 1942, p. 3; available on
microfilm, /Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-45/ (Frederick,
Md.: University Publications of America, 1983).

17. Eisenhower.

18. When the War Plans Division was renamed the Operations Division on
23 March 1942, the newly reconstituted Current Section was assigned code
management responsibilities, a function it performed for the duration of
the war; see Ray S. Cline, /United States Army in World War II: Vol. IV,
The War Department: Part 2, Washington Command Post: The Operations
Division/ (Washington: GPO, 1951), pp. 106, 131.

19. Hines, p. 42.

20. Warren F. Kimball, ed., /Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete
Correspondence: Vol. I, Alliance Emerging, October 1933-November 1942/
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), p. 280; also /Vol. II,
Alliance Forged, November 1942-February 1944/, pp. 491-92.

21. Ibid.

22. Winston S. Churchill, /The Second World War: Vol. V, Closing the
Ring/ (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951), p. 662.

23. Churchill, /The World Crisis: 1916-1918/ (New York: Scribners,
1927), I, 279; also II, 125ff.

24. Churchill, /Closing the Ring/, p. 662.

25. Kimball, I, 280.

26. Ibid.

27. Michael Howard, /History of the Second World War: United Kingdom
Military Series: Vol. IV, Grand Strategy, August 1942-September 1943/
(London: HMSO, 1972), p. 430.

28. Ibid.

29. W. G. F. Jackson, /"Overlord": Normandy 1944/ (London:
Davis-Poynter, 1978), p. 89; Omar N. Bradley, /A Soldier's Story/ (New
York: Henry Holt, 1951), p. 172.

30. Churchill may have sought an alternative to Roundhammer as much for
security reasons as aesthetics. This name, in conjunction with the name
of the planned invasion of southern France, dubbed Anvil, gave a pretty
clear hint as to the Allies' hammer-and-anvil strategy. While the
foregoing is my own speculation, it is known that Anvil was renamed
Dragoon precisely because the Allies feared that "the enemy might
finally light on the significance of the word." See Forrest C. Pogue,
/George C. Marshall, Vol. II, Organizer of Victory/ (New York: Viking
Press, 1973), p. 413.

31. David Kahn, /The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing/ (New
York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 503.

32. Hines, p. 43.

33. E. B. Potter, /Sea Power: A Naval History/ (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1960), p. 777.

34. Barton Whaley, /Codeword Barbarossa/ (Cambridge, Mass.:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1973), p. 16, note.

35. David Irving, /Hitler's War/ (New York: Viking Press, 1977), p. 142.

36. Whaley, p. 18.

37. Montagu, p. 53.

38. The first World War II operation names were made public on 10
October 1945, upon release of: US War Dept., General Staff, /Biennial
Report of the Chief of the United States Army, July 1, 1943 to June 30,
1945, to the Secretary of War/ (Washington: GPO, 1945). See "Code Names
of Big Operations Revealed; Invasion of Kyushu Was to Be `Olympic,'"
/The New York Times/, 10 October 1945, p. 13.

39. US Dept. of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, /Department of Defense
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms/ (Washington: GPO, 23 March
1994), pp. 72, 261.

40. David Sidney Shalett, "Test Atomic Bombs to Blast 100 Ships at
Marshalls Atoll," /The New York Times/, 25 January 1946, p. 1.

41. Jonathan M. Weisgall, /Operation Crossroads: The Atomic Tests at
Bikini Atoll/ (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994), p. 32.

42. See, for example, "Operation Crossroads," /The New York Times/
/Magazine/, 17 February 1946, p. 8.

43. Weisgall, p. 32.

44. "Notes and Comment," /The New Yorker/, 27 July 1946, p. 12.

45. D. Clayton James, /The Years of MacArthur: Vol. III, Triumph and
Disaster, 1945-1964/ (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), p. 465.

46. For example, the name Operation Chromite appeared in /Time/ only ten
days after the landing took place. Because the name was meaningless, it
received only passing attention. See "Battle of Korea," /Time/, 25
September 1950, p. 26.

47. Matthew B. Ridgway, /The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge/
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), 85ff.

48. For one Marine's reaction to the name Ripper, see Henry Berry, /Hey,
Mac, Where Ya Been? Living Memories of the U.S. Marines in the Korean
War/ (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), p. 209.

49. Ridgway actually told reporters about Operation Killer before it
commenced but requested that they not report the information until the
attack had begun. See James F. Schnabel, /United States Army in the
Korean War: Vol. III, Policy and Direction: The First Year/ (Washington:
GPO, 1972), p. 340.

50. Lindesay Parrott, "U.N. Units Advance More Than 8 Miles in Drive in
Center," /The New York Times/, 22 February 1951, p. 1.

51. Ibid.

52. Berry, pp. 26, 209.

53. Parrott; "Operation Killer," /The New York Times/, 25 February 1951,
sec. IV, p. 1; Lindesay Parrott, "U.S. Forces Launch 2 Attacks on Reds;
Main Push Goes On," /The New York Times/, 1 March 1951, p. 1; "Gen. Matt
and Gen. Mud: Waterlogged Marines Join U.N.'s Operation Killer," /Life/,
12 March 1951, p. 39. The writer of a letter published in /The New York
Times/ noted that he had seen "frequent references in the newspapers,
including /The Times/, to `Operation Killer'"; see Hugh Gallaher, letter
to the editor, printed as "Military Designation Criticized," /The New
York Times/, 6 March 1951, p. 26.

54. The words are Ridgway's, paraphrasing Collins; see Ridgway, p. 110.

55. Gallaher; Jacob Herzfeld, letter to the editor, 28 February 1951,
printed as "Korea's Holocaust," /The New York Times/, 3 March 1951, p. 12.

56. "Union Gains Cited by Harry Bridges," /The New York Times/, 3 April
1951, p. 55.

57. Ridgway, p. 110.

58. Harry G. Summers, /Korean War Almanac/ (New York: Facts on File,
1990), p. 156.

59. Ridgway, p. 110.

60. Ibid., p. 111.

61. Gregory R. Clark, /Words of the Vietnam War: The Slang, Jargon,
etc./ (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1990), p. 365.

62. Ibid, pp. 369, 379.

63. Shelby L. Stanton, /Anatomy of a Division: The 1st Cavalry in
Vietnam /(Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1987), p. 70.

64. Clark, p. 374.

65. Daniel C. Hallin, /The "Uncensored War": The Media and Vietnam/ (New
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986), p. 145; see also the series of stories
in /The New York Times/ written by R. W. Apple, Jr., which appeared 28
January (p. 12), 31 January (p. 12), 2 February (p. 15), and 3 February
(p. 15) 1966.

66. Stanton, p. 72.

67. William C. Westmoreland, /A Soldier Reports/ (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1976), p. 164.

68. Ibid.; Stanton, p. 72.

69. Westmoreland, p. 164.

70. For a comprehensive listing of operation names used during the
Vietnam War, see Clark, pp. 363-83.

71. Westmoreland, p. 164.

72. "DoD Information Security Program," DOD Directive 5200.1, 1 June
1972; reprinted in /Federal Register/, 3 August 1972, Vol. 37, No. 150,
pp. 15655-15686. The guidelines concerning nicknames which appear on
page 15685 do not appear in the previous version of DOD Directive
5200.1, entitled "Safeguarding Official Information in the Interests of
the Defense of the United States," 8 July 1957; rpt. in US Dept. of
Defense, /Implementation of Recommendations of Coolidge Committee on
Classified Information/ (Washington: July 1957), Pt. 2, App. 4, Encl. 1,
p. 1.

73. The same guidelines appear in the newest version of this regulation:
US Dept. of Defense, /Information Security Program Regulation/, 5200.1-R
(Washington: June 1986), p. C-2.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid., pp. C-1 to C-3.

76. US Dept. of Defense, /Code Name, Nickname, and Exercise Term (NICKA)
WWMCCS System: Project Manual/ (Washington: 20 February 1975), p. 1.

77. US Dept. of Defense, /Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Reporting
Structure: Vol. II, Joint Reports: Part 14, General Use/Miscellaneous:
Chapter 4, Code Word, Nickname, and Exercise Term Report, Change 11/,
JCS Pub 1-03.19 (Washington: 13 March 1990), p. 14-4-9.

78. Ibid., p. 14-4-6.

79. Ibid., pp. 14-4-14 and 14-4-16.

80. The one exception to the poorly named operations of the period was
Operation Eagle Claw, the effort to free US hostages held in Iran. But
the name never gained currency because the mission was aborted. Instead,
the mission has become known as the "Iranian hostage rescue attempt" or
simply as Desert One, the designation of the staging area where the
mission was scrubbed.

81. David Hoffman and Fred Hiatt, "Weinberger Says U.S. May Stay for
Weeks," /The Washington Post/, 4 November 1983, p. B2.

82. Representative Byron raised this criticism in a congressional
post-mortem of Urgent Fury when she questioned whether the military
hadn't "[gone] to overkill" in the operation; see US Congress, House,
Committee on the Armed Services, /Lessons Learned as a Result of the
U.S. Military Operations in Grenada, Hearings/ (Washington: GPO, 1984),
p. 45.

83. William S. Lind, quoted in Robert J. Beck, /The Grenada Invasion:
Politics, Law, and Foreign Policy Decisionmaking/ (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press, 1993), p. 17.

84. Jack Eisen, "`Lede of the Week' Award," /The Washington Post/, 4
November 1983, p. B2.

85. Marc D. Felman, /The Military/Media Clash and the New Principle of
War: Media Spin/ (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Univ. Press, June 1993), p. 15.

86. Hiebert, p. 32.

87. Christina Jacqueline Johns and P. Ward Johnson, /State Crime, the
Media, and the Invasion of Panama/ (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994), p. 64.

88. See /Houston Post/ editorial, 21 December 1989; rpt. in /Editorials
on File/ (16-31 December 1989), Vol. 20, No. 24, p. 1487; and /Daily
Oklahoman/ editorial, 22 December 1989; rpt. in the same edition of
/Editorials on File/, p. 1483.

89. "Operation High Hokum," /The New York Times/, 23 December 1989, p. 30.

90. Johns and Johnson, p. 64.

91. Jonathan Alter et al., "The Propaganda War," /Newsweek/, 25 February
1991, p. 38.

92. See for example: McClain and Levin, pp. 6-15; Felman; Brent Baker,
"Desert Shield/Storm: The War of Words and Images," /Naval War College
Review/, 44 (Autumn 1991), 59-65; William M. Hammond, "The Army and
Public Affairs: Enduring Principles," /Parameters/, 19 (June 1989), 57-74.

93. A LEXIS/NEXIS word search of major newspapers and magazines for the
three-year period January 1990 to December 1994 revealed that the name
"Desert Storm" appeared in 8276 newspaper and 4466 magazine articles,
while the name "Gulf War"--or a variant, like "Persian Gulf
War"--appeared in 86,652 newspaper and 13,642 magazine articles. Clearly
Gulf War and its variants are more popular than Desert Storm, but the
frequency with which Desert Storm appears (roughly 10 percent of the
newspaper citations and one-third of the magazine articles) is significant.

94. "Military Makes Every Word Count, Picking Code Names, Like Desert
Shield, A Matter of Pride," /Orlando Sentinel Tribune/, 19 August 1990,
p. A17.

95. H. Norman Schwarzkopf and Peter Petre, /It Doesn't Take a Hero/ (New
York: Bantam Books, 1992), p. 309.

96. Telephone conversation with Dr. Ronald Cole, Historian, Joint Office
of History, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., 12
January 1995.

97. Like the first two letters of "peninsula," the first two letters of
"desert" do not fall into the alphabetic sequences assigned to CENTCOM.

98. Schwarzkopf, pp. 309-10.

99. On the CINC's personal role in naming Desert Storm, see Schwarzkopf,
p. 320.

100. "Words of War," /The Nation/, 12 August 1991, p. 177.

101. Instant Thunder was a deliberate allusion to Rolling Thunder, the
name of the two-and-one-half-year bombing operation over North Vietnam,
which many Air Force officers believed failed because of its gradual
strategy. See Rick Atkinson, /Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian
Gulf War/ (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1993), p. 59. Instant Thunder seems
to be the first instance where a nickname purposefully (and critically)
alluded to a previously named operation.

102. Schwarzkopf, p. 413.

103. Joshua Hammer et al., "You Must Be the Thunder and the Lightning,"
/Newsweek/, 28 January 1991, p. 31.

104. Donna Miles and Patrick Swan, "What's in a Name?" /Soldiers/,
February 1992, p. 40.

105. McClain and Levin, p. 11.

106. Miles and Swan, p. 48.

107. Doyle et al., p. 2.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Lieutenant Colonel Gregory C. Sieminski, USA, is a 1995 graduate of the
Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, whose next assignment is at
Headquarters, Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), the Netherlands. A
military intelligence officer, he has held a variety of intelligence
command and staff positions in Panama, Hawaii, and the United States.
>From 1987 to 1991 he taught at the US Military Academy in the Department
of English. This article is a derivative of his student paper which won
the Naval War College President's Essay Competition for 1994-95.