


OIG Report on CIA Accountability
With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks

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~~(S)~~ **RELATED FINDING 20: ISSUES RELATING
TO SAUDI ARABIA**

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
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
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(U) Joint Inquiry Discussion

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
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~~(S// [redacted] NF)~~ The report emphasized that the JI had made "no final determinations as to the reliability or sufficiency of the information" regarding Saudi issues raised by its inquiry.

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(U) Assessment of the Finding

~~(S// [redacted] NF)~~ Many of the points of this finding relate to the FBI's investigative efforts on the Saudi intelligence presence in the United States and of Saudi officials' contacts with terrorists in the country, and, as such, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) 9/11 Review Team defers consideration of these to the Department of Justice and the FBI. The Team lacks access to the full range of investigative materials in FBI possession and is therefore unable to either concur or dissent on those points. In addition, the Team encountered no evidence that the Saudi Government knowingly and willingly supported al-Qa'ida terrorists. Individuals in both the Near East Division (NE) and the Counterterrorist Center (CTC) [redacted] [redacted] told the Team they had not seen any reliable reporting confirming Saudi Government involvement with and financial support for terrorism prior to 9/11, although a few also speculated that dissident

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sympathizers within the government may have aided al-Qa'ida. A January 1999 Directorate of Intelligence (DI)/Office of Transnational Issues Intelligence Report on Bin Ladin's finances indicated that "limited" reporting suggested that "a few Saudi Government officials" may support Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) but added that the reporting was "too sparse to determine with any accuracy" such support. None of the Saudi Government officials named in that report was a member of a [redacted]

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
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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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Figure R20-1




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Figure R20-2



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Figure 20-3




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Figure 20-4





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
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
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
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
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
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
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(U) Implications



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
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(U) Accountability




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