Washington, April 4, 1951.
CIA/OPC STRATEGIC WAR PLAN IN SUPPORT OF THE JOINT OUTLINE EMERGENCY WAR PLAN
This plan provides for conversion of peacetime covert operations to wartime needs in support of military war plans based on forces available. This plan is limited to such operations and excludes consideration of the manifold CIA/OPC responsibilities for covert operations in peace, in cold war and in overt war not in direct support of military war plans.
a. For the purposes of this paper, “D (The) Day” refers to the day on which actual, active combat operations of conventional warfare start in a general war.
b. “Peace” as used herein refers to all situations short of overt general war.
At any time after 1 January 1951, war may be forced upon the United States and her Allies by acts of aggression on the part of the USSR and/or her satellites.
a. (1) Basic Assumption (JCS). This plan may be effective at any moment, but full implementation of the plan is predicated on actual hostilities not starting before 30 June 1952.
b. Special Assumptions (JCS).
(1) M–Day and D–Day may be the same.
(2) The USSR will have the following Allies:
The political alignment of Korea will depend on the outcome of the UN actions there.
(3) The Western bloc will consist of the following:
(a) Allied with the United States at the outbreak of war:
(b) Bound to Allies by treaty commitments (subject to provisions of the UN Charter):
(c) The Arab States are favorably disposed toward the Allies but are unlikely to fight, especially outside of their own territory.
(d) The Allies will have base facilities at least in Japan.
(e) The status of the governments of Western Germany and Austria is dependent upon plans under NATO.
(f) Greece is entirely sympathetic and will help as far as possible.
(g) Sympathetic to the Western bloc but probably not belligerents at the outset:
(4) Neutral Countries
(a) Probable neutral countries unless attacked:
(5) Western European countries under NATO will have improved economically and militarily but, except for the UK, will be unable to resist effectively, being overrun and occupied.
(6) Atomic weapons will be used by both sides.
(7) Biological warfare may be used by either side.
(8) War may start with little or no warning. At best, it will be preceded by a period of political negotiations and tension which will give the Allies a few months warning. The Allies may decide to start the main attack.
(9) Part of the oil of the Middle East will become vital to the Allied effort at some stage of the war.
(10) It is expected that the Soviets will employ subversive activities and unconventional warfare on a global scale and to an extent unparalleled in history.
c. Added Assumptions (CIA). For the Armed Forces to capitalize on CIA effort, they should on a top priority basis:
(a) Provide material, logistical, and administrative (communication) support from the Army.
(b) Ear-mark, effective for use on “D–Day” (or earlier if the imminence of Soviet invasion is unmistakable), the necessary Air Support from the Air Force to include coordinated and simultaneous attack by both Air and Unconventional Forces and the execution of night operations for the purpose of infiltrating personnel and sabotage stores.
(c) Detail for duty with CIA the selected Department of Defense officer and enlisted personnel who are trained in Clandestine Warfare under CIA auspices.
(2) For Covert Operations in Europe
(a) Authorize a limited relaxation of security measures and activities in Europe under Army and/or Air Force cover and the allocation to CIA of a safe Military training area in Germany for processing, billeting, and administering limited number of CIA recruited Austrian and German indigenes now available for training.
(b) Authorize the utilization by CIA of selected personnel from U.S. controlled indigenous labor battalions in Germany as a source for recruiting personnel to be trained and employed in Clandestine Operations.
(c) Expedite procurement of and authorize CIA participation in the screening and selection of indigenous personnel to be recruited by the Army under the Lodge Bill, so that an adequate percentage of the personnel screened and accepted can be made available to CIA.
(d) In conjunction with CIA, set up without delay in the European Theater a planning team to effectuate the above. This team to consist of one each member from the Army, Air Forces, and CIA.
4. Strategic Concept Peace and War
a. Peace. To conduct covert operations in support of U. S. foreign policy objectives and to plan and prepare for support of military war plans.
b. War. In time of war to conduct covert operations in military theaters in support of military war plans as well as covert operations in support of U.S. foreign policy directives. In areas outside of military theaters, to conduct covert operations in support of over-all politico-military war plans to reduce the Soviet war potential.
5. Basic Missions
a. Peace. In general CIA/OPC's present basic activities are specifically prescribed in NSC 10/2 as follows:
CIA/OPC has intensified and amplified certain of these cold war activities in response to NSC 68, NSC 58/2, NSC 59, NSC 103/1, NSC 104 and other significant NSC documents.22. Regarding NSC 68 and NSC 59, see and , respectively. For NSC 58/2, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. V, pp. 42–54. For NSC 103/1, see ibid., 1950, vol. V, pp. 463–466. For NSC 104, see ibid., 1951, vol. I, pp. 1023–1034.
b. War. In time of war, or when the President directs, all plans for covert operations shall be coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a view to the accomplishment of the following mission:
THE UTILIZATION OF COVERT OPERATIONS TO THE FULLEST PRACTICABLE EXTENT TO ASSIST IN ACCOMPLISHING THE MILITARY DEFEAT OF THE U.S.S.R. AND HER SATELLITES. HIGHEST PRIORITY AMONG COVERT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF MILITARY WAR PLANS WILL BE GIVEN TO THE RETARDATION OF THE SOVIET ADVANCE IN WESTERN EUROPE.
6. Specific Undertakings
a. Support by covert means the following military undertakings:
(1) Essential defensive tasks
(a) Protection of the Western Hemisphere outside of the continental U.S.
(b) Defense of the U.K.
(c) Holding of Northwest Africa and the Cairo–Suez area.
(2) Strategic air offensive
(a) The strategic air offensive will be directed against:
(3) Operations in Western Eurasia
(a) Operations in Western Europe will include defensive operations; if the situation renders it imperative, withdrawal until assumption of offensive operations and reoccupation of lost territory. The defensive operations by unconventional warfare forces in support of military war plans will include, on highest priority, the retardation of the Soviet advance and attacks on Soviet forces and lines of communications at the outset of hostilities. Maximum pressure will be maintained during the time that the Allied forces are engaged in the Western European defense.
(4) Control of essential lines of communication as follows:
(a) Western Hemisphere to U.K.
(b) Western Hemisphere to Gibraltar
(c) East coast of U.S. to South America and South Africa
(d) West coast of U.S. to Japan, Okinawa, Philippines Anzam area, and Alaska
(e) U.K. to Gibraltar and Central and South Atlantic
(f) Gibraltar to Suez
b. Unconventional warfare against Soviet submarine and mining potential.
c. Increase of psychological warfare upon the outbreak of general overt war.
d. Increase of unconventional warfare upon the outbreak of general overt war.
7. Phasing of Tasks—General
a. Present to “D Day”
(1) Preparation of CIA war plan and coordination of this plan with that of the military theaters. Procurement and training of covert personnel, stockpiling of supplies, and matériel to be used in support of war plans. Conduct of approved covert operations.
(2) The activation and effectuation of such covert operations in support of war plans (e.g., evacuation, sabotage, or counter-sabotage) as may be ordered by competent authority.
(3) Preparation for the transition from peacetime execution of covert operations to the wartime execution under the command of the American Theater Commander. This will include activation of a special CIA staff at the American Theater Commander's headquarters.
b. First Phase (D to D + 3 Months)
The implementation of covert operations in support of theater war plans to cover withdrawals and in support of an air offensive. During this phase and beginning at the outset of hostilities, highest priority will be given to retardation of the Soviet advance, attacks on Soviet forces, and interruption of Soviet LOC's.
c. Second Phase (D + 3 Months to D + 12 Months)
Continuation of basic strategy of first phase to include the emphasis on the retardation of the Soviet advance.
d. Third Phase (D + 12 Months to D + 24 Months)
The implementation of covert operations in support of theater war plans aimed at stabilizing the Soviet offensive. Upon stabilization of the Soviet offensive, such covert operations will be directed toward enhancing the Allied position and toward initiating an Allied offensive either in this phase or phase IV.
e. Fourth Phase (D + 24 Months to End of War)
Continuation of basic strategy of second and third phase with increasing emphasis on covert operations in support of an Allied offensive and in support of the establishment of military government. Operations to nullify “scorched earth” tactics on the part of the retreating enemy will be mounted at this time.
III. TASKS FOR CIA/OPC DIVISIONS IN SUPPORT OF MILITARY WAR OPERATIONS
Each geographical division will plan, develop facilities for, and execute upon direction, covert operations in the countries within its area, in coordination with and in support of the programs of other United States Government agencies, as follows:
a. Eastern Europe:33. Balkans, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Baltic States, Poland, Hungary, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, USSR. [Footnote in the original.] Assist U.S. armed forces to
(1) Retard from the outset of hostilities, the Soviet advance, attack the Soviet forces, destroy their lines of communication, and exert the maximum pressure on them during the period that the Allied forces are engaged in the defense of Western Europe. This is of highest priority.
(2) Incite discontent amongst Soviet peoples with the Kremlin-controlled government and keep alive and strengthen their hope for eventual liberation therefrom.
(3) Develop the resistance potential of opposition elements within the USSR and countries under its domination.
(4) Induce, by every stratagem and means possible, the defection of satellite states and their separation from the USSR.
(5) After the Western Allies are prepared to capitalize thereon, instigate revolts in selected countries in the area with a view to deposing the communist regimes and replacing them with governments which are friendly to the cause and subscribe to the principles set forth in the U.N. Charter.
(6) Inhibit the growth of Soviet political and military capabilities for further offensive action against the non-communist world.
(7) In countries in the area not under control of the USSR, strengthen the will and ability of the peoples and the governments to resist efforts at communist subversion.
(8) Assist the military theater commanders, in the event of hostilities, in conducting such operations against the Soviet Union and its satellites as will destroy the effectiveness of their combined military forces, and the effectiveness of supporting communist parties, resulting in their replacement by governments sympathetic to the free world.
(9) Provide support to other competently authorized operations and activities directed from or toward the area.
(10) Priority in CIA preparations for wartime operations insofar as Western Europe is concerned will be in areas east of the Rhine–Alps line.
(1) Assist U.S. Armed Forces to retard, where and when applicable, the Soviet advance, attack the Soviet forces, destroy their lines of communication, and exert the maximum pressure on them during the period that the Allied forces are engaged in the defense of Western Europe. This is of highest priority.
(2) Disaffect local Communist parties from the Cominform and the CPSU(B).
(3) Dissipate the support and strength of the Communist party in each country.
(4) Strengthen the will and ability of the peoples in the area to resist both the internal and external forces of Communism.
(5) Prepare the peoples of the area, in case of attack by external Communist forces, to engage in resistance activities and the Western powers to communicate with, assist, and direct this resistance.
(6) Provide support to other competently authorized operations and activities directed from or toward the area.
(7) Every possible precaution must be taken to insure that the pattern of recruiting, organizing, and coordinating activities in North Atlantic Treaty Organization areas does not indicate that the United States lacks confidence that the line of the Rhine–Alps can be held. Such precautions may require the use of cover plans to conceal the true purpose of preparations in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization areas.
c. Near East and Africa55. All of Africa, Israel, Arab States, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordania, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Turkey, Iran, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Ceylon, Tibet. [Footnote in the original.]
(1) Acquaint the peoples in critical parts of the area with the imperialist and subversive aims of the USSR and local communist movements.
(2) Strengthen the will and ability of the peoples in the area to resist the internal and external encroachments of communist forces.
(3) Enroll the peoples and governments in the area on the side of the West in the East-West conflict.
(4) Ensure the availability to the Western world, and the denial to the USSR and satellites, of the strategically important resources of the area.
(5) Alleviate the conflicts and differences between or among countries within the area with a view to establishing harmonious relations between the various states in the area.
(6) Prepare the peoples of those areas likely to be overrun by hostile forces in case of war to carry on resistance activities, and the Western allies to communicate with, assist, and direct this resistance.
(7) Provide support to other competently authorized operations and activities directed from or towards the area.
(1) Frustrate by all possible means the efforts of the USSR to establish a regime in China subservient to the interests of the USSR; and to consolidate its control over the territories and peoples of China.
(2) Foster the emergence of and develop a Chinese political leadership which can command popular support of the Chinese people and not be subject to domination by the USSR.
(3) Dissipate the support and strength of local Communist parties in those countries where such parties are actively functioning.
(4) In countries in the area not under the control of the USSR or the Communist Party of China, acquaint the peoples and governments with Communist aims and strengthen their will and ability to resist efforts at Communist subversion.
(5) In countries in the area likely to be overrun by Communist forces, prepare the peoples thereof to engage in resistance activities and the Western Allies to communicate with, assist, and direct this resistance.
(6) Develop the resistance potential of opposition elements in Eastern USSR.
(7) Provide support to other competently authorized operations or activities directed from or toward the area.
e. Western Hemisphere77. South and Central Americas. [Footnote in the original.]
(1) Dissipate the support and strength of the local Communist party in those countries where one is actively functioning.
(2) Strengthen the will and ability of the peoples in the area to resist both the internal and external forces of communism.
(3) Ensure the availability to the United States and its Allies, and the denial to the USSR and satellites, of those strategically important resources designated by compotent authority.
(4) Provide support to other competently authorized operations and activities directed from or toward the area.
f. Psychological Staff Division
(1) To provide the over-all direction, technical guidance, and means (as required) to Area Divisions for exploitation of economic, political, propaganda, and scientific situations.
(2) To plan and develop facilities for covert economic, political, propaganda, and scientific operations, and execute those operations requiring centralized control and which transcend military theaters of operations and are not within the operational capabilities of the Area Divisions, to:
(a) Weaken the position of the Soviet Bloc and strengthen the position of the U.S. and Allies.
(b) Combat the activities of Communist-controlled international organizations.
(c) Strengthen the will and ability of non-Communist international organizations to resist Communist effort at subversion, and encourage these organizations in anti-Communist activities.
(d) Encourage the subjects of the USSR and its Satellites to desert Communist jurisdiction, renounce allegiance to their rulers, and seek haven in non-Communist jurisdiction; provide interim sanctuary and support to such disaffected peoples and other refugees from USSR and Satellite jurisdiction; and prepare for their employment in the task of liberating their respective homelands.
(e) Accomplish such other missions as may be assigned from time to time in the pursuit of opportunities or support of other projects.
9. Operational Forces
a. Tab “A”88. None of the tabs are printed. outlines the CIA/OPC operational forces available on a phased basis.
b. Tab “B” outlines the Air Force support requirements.
c. Tab “C” outlines the Naval support requirements.
IV. Administrative and Logistical Matters
Requirements for logistical support, bases, and personnel and materiel in the ZI for period from 1 July 1952 to 1 July 1954 will follow.99. Not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Operations, Job 79–01228A, Box 6)
V. Command, Communications, and Liaison Matters
11. The command and communications channel of CIA will be from the Headquarters in Washington to its principal headquarters in the field. In active theaters of war where American forces are engaged, covert operations will be conducted under the direct command of the American Theater Commander and orders therefore will be transmitted through the Joint Chiefs of Staff unless otherwise directed by the President.
12. For reasons of security and adequate liaison, the DCI shall maintain independent communications with designated representatives overseas, including lateral communications between theaters. Arrangements for such communications shall be coordinated with those of the military.
13. Command and Liaison Procedures for War Planning of Covert Operations in Theaters (see Annex 1).1010. Not printed.
1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Operations, Job 79–01228A, Box 6. Top Secret. Printed from a copy that indicates that the last three pages were revised on November 1.
2 Regarding NSC 68 and NSC 59, see Documents 5 and 2, respectively. For NSC 58/2, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. V, pp. 42–54. For NSC 103/1, see ibid., 1950, vol. V, pp. 463–466. For NSC 104, see ibid., 1951, vol. I, pp. 1023–1034.
3 Balkans, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Baltic States, Poland, Hungary, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, USSR. [Footnote in the original.]
4 Scandinavian Countries, Benelux, United Kingdom, France, Iberia, Italy, Trieste. [Footnote in the original.]
5 All of Africa, Israel, Arab States, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordania, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Turkey, Iran, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Ceylon, Tibet. [Footnote in the original.]
6 Siam, Malaya, Indonesia, Philippines, Burma, China, Japan, Okinawa, Korea, New Zealand, Australia, Pacific Islands. [Footnote in the original.]
7 South and Central Americas. [Footnote in the original.]
8 None of the tabs are printed.
9 Not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Operations, Job 79–01228A, Box 6)
10 Not printed.