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Promoting Social Justice, Human Rights, and Peace

Inside the CIA: On Company Business

Transcript courtesy of John Bernhart

Frank Church (United States Senator, 1957-81; Chairman of Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, 1975-76): Have you brought with you some of those devices, which would have enabled the CIA to use this poison for killing people?

William Colby (CIA, 1947-75; Director, 1973-75): We have indeed. The round thing at the top is obviously the sight. It works by electricity. There's a battery in the handle, and it fires a small dart.

Frank Church (United States Senator, 1957-81; Chairman of Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, 1975-76): And the dart itself, when it strikes the target, does the target know that he has been hit and he is about to die?

William Colby (CIA, 1947-75; Director, 1973-75): A special one was developed which potentially would be able to enter the target without perception.

Frank Church (United States Senator, 1957-81; Chairman of Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, 1975-76): As a murder instrument, that is about as efficient as you can get.

William Colby (CIA, 1947-75; Director, 1973-75): It is a weapon: a very serious weapon.

Victor Marchetti (CIA, 1955-69; Executive Assistant to the Deputy Director): I first began working in intelligence while I was in the army in Germany during the Cold War years. Later, when I was a student at Penn State, I was recruited by the CIA.

James Wilcott (CIA, 1957-66): The guy told me he was from DoD, Department of Defense. We were recruited, or believed that we were being recruited, by DoD. It was not until we got to Washington that we found out that it was CIA. However, the day just before we left for Washington, we were sent a telegram that read something like, "Your employment with the DoD will involve assignment to CIA." And we did not even know what CIA meant at the time. We did not even know what the initials stood for.

Caption: We are facing an implacable enemy. There are no rules in such a game. We must learn to subvert, sabotage, and destroy our enemies by more clever [sic], more sophisticated, and more effective means than those used against the United States (The Doolittle Report on the CIA, 1951).

David Atlee Phillips (CIA, 1954-75; Chief of Western Hemisphere Division): A secret organization is a risk in any society. I believe that it is a risk that we must take for the net gain because I believe that it is always going to be there. Now, let us say that we abolish the CIA. It has done so many bad things. Let us not ever have this kind of intelligence organization again. Do you know what is going to happen? American presidents are strong-willed men. They would not be in that office if they were not. If they do not have an intelligence service, they are going to create their own. It may not be very big, and they may reach into the loony bin to find the people to run it, and they may call it "the plumbers," but they will have it.

Inside the CIA: On Company Business, Part 1--The History

Newscasters: This is ABC, the American Broadcasting Company. This is the Mutual Broadcasting System. This is NBC, the National Broadcasting Company. This is CBS, the Columbia Broadcasting System.

Prime Minister Clement Attlee (British Prime Minister, 1945-51): Japan has today surrendered. The last of our enemies is laid low.

Newscaster: Now back to New York. People who have seen Times Square celebrations before declare that this is the biggest spectacle in New York history. Estimates of the crowd go beyond a half million.

William Colby (CIA, 1947-75; Director, 1973-75): We had just fought a war [World War II], and in a war, you conduct all sorts of operations: deception operations, behind-the-lines activities, sabotage, and all the rest of them. I was involved in that and the OSS [Office of Strategic Services] was involved in that. We demobilized all our military forces in 1945 and stripped our navy and army and air force. The Soviet forces were not demobilized. As the danger to Stalin's expansion and that kind of society seemed to be threatening to sweep around and cover more of the world, people were very concerned that they were faced with a new totalitarianism. It was the same as the Hitler one but under new management. And consequently, we developed the CIA in order to conduct the subversive level of the struggle.

Philip Agee (CIA, 1959-69): The great, burning question at the end of the war was how the United States was going to avert a return to the great unemployment of the depression period in the 1930s. During the last phase of the war, production in the United States was double what it had been in its best pre-war year, and this exceedingly high production had been achieved with ten million men under arms. There was only one way that the return to the unemployment of the Depression

could be averted and that was by creating foreign markets for our over production. This was the economic rationale behind the Marshall Plan and the reconstruction of the economy of Europe.

Harry S. Truman (United States President, 1945-53): We are following a definite and clear foreign policy. That policy has been, is now, and shall be to assist free men and free nations to recover from the devastation of war. We could choose the course of inaction. We could wait until depression caught up with us. Our other course is to take timely and forthright action.

Caption: Marshall Outlines European Recovery Plan to Congress (Movietone News).

Ed Thorgersen (Movietone News Announcer): Preparing for the special session of Congress, the Foreign Policy Committee of Senate and House hear Secretary of State Marshall tell what is needed to give the free nations of Europe economic support.

George C. Marshall (United States Secretary of State, 1947-49): I recommend that you give immediate and urgent consideration to a bill authorizing the appropriation of sufficient funds to provide the supplies necessary to permit the people of these countries to continue to eat, to work, and to survive the winter. We find ourselves, our nation, in a world position of vast responsibility. We can act for our own good by acting for the world's good.

Philip Agee (CIA, 1959-69): And the CIA comes into this because the political forces in Western Europe after World War II that were prevailing had been the backbone of the resistance to fascism, and they were the leftwing political parties, principally the communist parties, especially in France and Italy. These parties, knowing that the reconstruction of their economies would bring economic and political dependence on the United States, opposed the Marshall Plan, and the CIA was partly set up in order to combat on a political warfare basis the efforts by leftwing political organizations in Europe to impede the success of the Marshall Plan.

Caption: Unification Bill Signed.

Unidentified Movietone News Announcer: Signing the bill that will enable our national military establishment to do more coordinating and less pulling in opposite directions, President Truman uses a number of pens. These in turn are passed out as souvenirs to the witnesses, one of whom is the boss of the armed forces, Secretary of Defense Johnson.

Caption: Central Intelligence Agency established by National Security Act, September 18, 1947.

William Colby (CIA, 1947-75; Director, 1973-75): CIA was set up to first collect intelligence and to analyze intelligence, to centralize intelligence, to get it all together, so it could be all looked at together in the best academic tradition. Also, however, it was set up in order to struggle at that subversive level with the subversive forces that we faced.

Philip Agee (CIA, 1959-69): The CIA from the very beginning, at least as early as 1951, had used the information that it has collected, and it has used the information in order to penetrate and to manipulate the institutions of power in whatever country it is operating in order to influence the course of events in those countries. And essentially, this boils down to propping up those forces, which are considered to be the friendly forces, and to penetrating, dividing, weakening, and ultimately destroying those forces, which are considered to be the enemy forces.

Caption: Italy Faces Choice of Dictatorship or Democracy.

George C. Putnam (Movietone News Announcer): The Italian election campaign [is] at the crisis. Premier De Gasperi calls for votes to defend freedom and beat communism, and he champions America's Marshall Plan. Communist leader Togliatti in Rome hurls pro-Soviet, anti-American propaganda at an election campaign gathering of Italian Reds. To combat the communist peril in the Italian election, the Pontiff of Rome repeatedly urges the people to vote against the Reds.

Caption: CIA Channels \$1 Million to Christian Democrats in Italian Election, April 1948.

William Colby (CIA, 1947-75; Director, 1973-75): I think that whenever we had the choice, we tried to support center democratic forces. I mean, clearly, that is what we did in Europe. We did not support any fascist groups in Europe. We did not have to because there were good socialists, good Christian Democrats. We did not go to the rightwing forces.

Joseph Burkholder Smith (CIA, 1951-73): I joined CIA in September 1951. The preceding year, April 1950, NSC68 was drawn up. It was a joint, interagency working paper. It was inspired primarily by Dean Acheson, and it was the blueprint for the Cold War.

Dean Acheson (United States Secretary of State, 1949-53): It is not only the threat of direct military attack which must be considered but also that of conquest by default, by pressure, by persuasion, by subversion, by neutralism, by all the paraphernalia of indirect aggression which the communist movement has used.

Joseph Burkholder Smith (CIA, 1951-73): It was the height of the Cold War. Senator McCarthy, Joe McCarthy, was terrorizing the nation with charges of a great, internal communist conspiracy. The State Department, according to him (you will remember--those of you who are old enough), was filled with Soviet spies.

Caption: Could It Happen? Communist Coup in Wisconsin.

Joe King (Movietone News Announcer): [This is] Main Street, USA at peace unaware that a cabal of conspirators plots its enslavement. At Mosinee, Wisconsin, two former communists show how a highly organized minority using the seizure techniques taught in Moscow can take over a city. First, the mayor is hustled off to jail and then the chief of police [is arrested]. In the Red primer, an early lesson teaches the importance of controlling law enforcement. Without a controlled press, Red tyranny cannot survive, so the town's newspaper editor, who is likely to be independent, is quickly sent to a guarded concentration camp. Prepared propaganda speedily rolls from the once-free presses, and the picture [of Stalin] on the front page tells one and all who gets allegiance from now on.

Unidentified American Legion Member Pretending to be a Soviet Invader: The official name of the government established by the revolution shall be known as the United Soviet States of America, USSA, affiliated with the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics of which Moscow is the capital of the worldwide communist super-state.

Joseph Burkholder Smith (CIA, 1951-73): The concept was that the Soviet Union was engaged in a worldwide effort to obtain domination everywhere.

Henry Martin Jackson (United States Senator, 1953-83): The question is whether the machinery that was set up as a result of our experience in a hot war is adequate to deal with what may well be a ten-, a twenty-five-, or a fifty-year struggle in the Cold War. The problems presented are entirely different. I think, the Russians are counting on a lack of staying power on the part of our country; I think, they feel that we are sort of slapdash and slaphappy and we do not have the staying power and the patience to put up with a long-term struggle.

Dean Acheson (United States Secretary of State, 1949-53): We have passed through a time of the awakening of people to the nature of the true danger in the world. We are now deep in a period of action.

Philip Agee (CIA, 1959-69): The institutions of power, which are penetrated and which attempts are made to manipulate them, are the security services, the military institutions, the trade union organizations especially, the youth and student movements, cultural organizations, professional societies, and in a very big way the public information media.

Dwight D. Eisenhower (United States President, 1953-61): We need powerful radio stations abroad operated without governmental restrictions to tell in vivid and convincing form about the decency and essential fairness of democracy. The Crusade for Freedom will provide for the expansion of Radio Free Europe into a

network of stations. They will be given the simplest, clearest charter in the world: to tell the truth.

Sig Mickelson (Radio Free Europe, 1975-80; President): Radio Liberty was funded entirely with CIA funds, I think, from the very beginning up until 1971 or 1972. Radio Free Europe was supported in part by the Crusade for Freedom and later the Radio Free Europe Fund.

Crusade for Freedom Appeal for Public Support to Russian Underground: These carry more than the message of freedom. They give specific instruction to the Russian people how to work for their liberation with maximum effectiveness and minimum danger under the very noses of the Soviet secret police. To achieve a truly free Russia, your allies behind the Iron Curtain need your help. They need moral support and your material aid.

Sig Mickelson (Radio Free Europe, 1975-80; President): No one really knew that it was funded by CIA. When I say no one, obviously, some persons did; and I am not sure when I personally found out, but it was fairly early. But at that time, I think, we took the position which most Europeans do now that national intelligence is part of the whole foreign policy, or for that matter domestic policy, of any country, and support for CIA during the 1950s was certainly considered patriotic.

Unidentified Movietone News Announcer: The film industry signs up in the campaign to help answer Communist lies. Mr. Cecil B. DeMille says:

Cecil B. DeMille (Hollywood Filmmaker): Signing the Freedom Scroll today will cost you less than a minute of your time. Let it be your firm commitment to this warfare for the minds of men that this world under God shall have a new birth of freedom.

Philip Agee (CIA, 1959-69): One of the principal mechanisms, which the CIA used after World War II in its programs to influence the course of events in different countries, was the use of front organizations. For example, in the youth field, the CIA set up the World Assembly of Youth, which continues today with its headquarters in Brussels. In the student field, the CIA set up the Coordinating Secretariat of National Unions of Students.

Joseph Burkholder Smith (CIA, 1951-73): The operation runs in a very simple way. Most people will join an outfit because their friends belong or because they think, "I guess it is a good idea that I belong to it," but only a few people ever bother to go to the meetings and these people, of course, always end up as executive officers. Of course, executive officers control all these organizations, and this was a technique that was used by Cord Meyer [CIA, 1951-77] and his division in youth organizations and in women's organizations and in other such groups.

Philip Agee (CIA, 1959-69): In the trade union field, the CIA founded or helped to found the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions with its headquarters in Brussels which continues to exist today.

Paul Sakwa (CIA, 1952-62; Labor Attach-- , London, Brussels): My first job at CIA was case officer for a French Left operation--non-Communist Left--and it was then that I was case officer for labor operations in France. And Irving Brown was then receiving money from us which he was passing around in France.

Caption: A Report on American Films Abroad

Unidentified Movietone News Announcer: At St. Paul, AF of L President William Green (center) and Dick Walsh (left), theatrical labor leader, hear Irving Brown give a firsthand report on the value of American motion pictures abroad.

Irving Brown (American Federation of Labor Free Trade Union Committee Representative in Europe): I have just returned from Europe where, as the representative of the American Federation of Labor for over four years, I have had the chance to see the terrific impact that the American movies are having on the peoples abroad, particularly those behind the Iron Curtain. This places a great responsibility upon the American people and the American motion picture industry.

Victor Reuther (Congress of Industrial Organizations Representative in Europe, 1951-54): I, as European director of the CIO, had some concept of what it costs to provide technical assistance to trade unions in Europe, and I know on the very modest budget, which the CIO could afford in those days, I could not possibly be a match for one Irving Brown, who was dispensing funds on a basis that very early began to raise doubts in my mind whether these funds were truly AF or L funds.

Tom Braden (CIA, 1950-54; Chief, International Organizations Division): In 1947, during a general strike, the communist unions were about to take over France. Competent observers feared that there would be a fall of the government and the French people were hungry: many of them took to the streets. It was at that time that David Dubinsky's International Ladies Garment Workers Union went to the aid of the free French unions. Jay Lovestone and Irving Brown, working for Dubinsky, gave money to a new union called the Force Ouvriere. Of course, labor unions cost a lot of money, and in those days France was paralyzed. So when they ran out of money, they came to the Central Intelligence Agency. Those people were doing a great job, and we were very glad to help them [ABC Interview, 1965].

Caption: New French Premier and Cabinet Fight Crisis of Strikes

Ed Thorgersen (Movietone News Announcer): New Premier Schuman strives to deal with a wave of strikes. Coal mines are tied up: communist-controlled unions calling the workers out and stopping fuel production as winter comes; a general

transport strike stopping the shipment of fuel and food in a country cold and hungry. Strikes are the communist tactic as the Marshall Plan develops economic aid to support freedom in France: the American program bitterly opposed by communists.

Victor Reuther (Congress of Industrial Organizations Representative in Europe, 1951-54): In the early days of the Marshall Plan when there were some political strikes called by communist trade union forces and perhaps communist political elements to try to defeat the Marshall Plan and to try to block foreign aid from being unloaded, it became a matter of breaking these strikes. And the US government, through Central Intelligence, called upon Irving Brown and Jay Lovestone to try to organize a countermove. And of course, if you want to break a strike, you go to boys, who have big, bare knuckles and who know how to wield cudgels. And they turned to what can best be described as the Corsican mafia under the leadership of Ferri-Pisani, who became really a paid agent of Central Intelligence to break the strikes.

Paul Sakwa (CIA, 1952-62; Labor Attach-- , London, Brussels): In about 1953, I terminated funds for Ferri-Pisani. Of course, Brown did not like this, but there was nothing for Ferri-Pisani to do at that time. And probably he was involved in smuggling heroin going through Marseille, and he did not need our money. During the executive board meeting of the ICFTU, I was acting labor attach-- and I was escort officer for Mr. and Mrs. George Meany and Mr. Meany's secretary, Virginia Tehas. On the last evening of their stay in Brussels, as I was driving Mr. Meany, Mrs. Meany, and Mr. Meany's secretary back to the Metropole Hotel, we got into a discussion about European labor and international labor. And perhaps it was unfair of me to go into this kind of dialogue with George Meany because he did not know that I was working for CIA and that I had once been Washington case officer for Irving Brown's labor projects in France (I was the one who set his budget and cut his budget). So it was unfair perhaps from that point of view, but I did take him on and I gave him my views on how unpopular Irving Brown was and as a consequence how much damage he was doing free labor discrediting people that he associated with because he had the reputation -- I knew it was deserved--of being a big moneybag man for CIA. Meany did not know how to quite cope with this except to explain to me that there were some things I did not know about. These were precisely the things that I knew everything about.

George Meany (AFL-CIO President, 1955-79): The American Federation of Labor, during my time as secretary, as treasurer, and as president, and the AFL-CIO, during my time as president, has never received any CIA money for any activity either directly or indirectly. (Reporter: Does that apply to Irving Brown as well?) Yes, that applies to Irving Brown as well [Press Conference, 1967].

Victor Reuther (Congress of Industrial Organizations Representative in Europe, 1951-54): When you've come through a devastating war, as the European countries did, and people literally were pulling themselves out of rubble, those first, courageous trade unionists, who had the courage to reestablish their organizations,

desperately deserved help and much of the first help that went to them (from the AF of L even) was legitimate, was proper, was humanitarian. You know, you send care packages and you give them mimeograph machines and so on. When it went beyond that and became a matter of twisting their arm and saying, "Look now, you are (you know) dependent on our help, and you have got to break the old CGIL organization in Italy," and when they turned to a marvelous human being like Leon Blum, Nobel prizewinner and courageous French Resistance hero, turned to him and (against his own better judgment) forced him into breaking with his lifelong ties with the CGT, the Trade Union Federation of France, and when they financed the split in France and Italy, they isolated these heroic figures from the main body of the labor movement and thus destroyed their influence and made them captives of foreign largess. And nothing will destroy the good name of a national trade union federation better than to have it become known that they are dependent upon handouts from their rich uncles in America, especially if the rich uncle in America gets it from the CIA.

Philip Agee (CIA, 1959-69): The purposes of all these different activities, the political and the front organizations in the different sectors of the population, were to fill this political vacuum that existed after World War II and to fill it with those forces which would be favorable to close relations with the United States (the so-called Atlantic Alliance) and in order to preclude any participation in these organizations and in the national political life by leftwing forces such as the Communist Party. It was to shove them aside and to isolate them so that the development of Europe for as many generations as possible could be brought under the control of those forces which are friendly to the United States and to the interests of our corporations, which were moving in part and parcel with the reconstruction of Europe after World War II.

Elsie Wilcott (CIA, 1957-66): In Washington, DC I worked on the Central America Desk (Mexico and the Central American countries). That was back in 1957-58, and at that time, well at first I thought that it was just information gathering, but then I realized that we were really intervening in the affairs of these countries.

Caption: Guatemala Ousts Reds to End Revolt!

Peter Roberts (News of the Day Announcer): In this Guatemalan town of Escuipulas just occupied by antigovernment forces are the first evidences of that much publicized anticommunist revolution. This is headquarters for the once-exiled officers leading the liberation forces. Colonel Miguel Mendoza and District Commander under overall rebel chief Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas.

James Wilcott (CIA, 1957-66): Elsie would come home and say things like, "Well, they are buying votes in Guatemala" or words to that effect, you know, and I would say, "Well, Elsie, you must have got something garbled, you know. The United States government would never do a thing like this." And I could not believe this. In the nine years, I think I said a thousand times, "The United States government

would never do a thing like this." And then I would find out that in fact they had done exactly that.

Caption: Crisis in Iran! Shah Flees as Mossadegh Rules!

Kani Evans (News of the Day Announcer): [There is] serious trouble in Teheran, capital of oil-rich Iran. Its pro-Western ruler, Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, has lost his throne (temporarily at least). When his army failed to oust the dictatorial-minded Premier Mossadegh, the Shah himself was forced to flee for his life to neighboring Baghdad. [He is] another king without a country.

Caption: Dramatic Events in Iran as Shah Regains Throne!

Kani Evans (News of the Day Announcer): In Rome, where he had fled, 33-year-old Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi hears astounding news: royalist forces have revolted, arrested Dr. Mossadegh, and want their sovereign home. Army men are given principal credit for the sensational change. When the army turned against its Mossadegh-appointed officers, it assured the return of the king.

David Atlee Phillips (CIA, 1954-75; Chief of Western Hemisphere Division): In 1953, a few CIA people managed to make some changes in Iran that President Eisenhower liked very much. In 1954, a few of us in Guatemala made some changes that seemed almost without effort. However, the demands kept growing. Intelligence was asked to do what armies should have been doing. It seemed so easy to hope that secret shenanigans could accomplish what an army should have been doing.

Victor Marchetti (CIA, 1955-69; Executive Assistant to the Deputy Director): We were supporting every half-assed dictator, military junta, oligarchy that existed in the Third World as long as they promised to somehow maintain the status quo, which would of course be beneficial to US geopolitical interests, military interests, big business interests, and other special interests.

Caption: Fidel: Cubans Back New Regime!

Peter Roberts (News of the Day Announcer): [We are] in front of the Presidential Palace in Havana, and it seems as far as the eye can see [there are] Cubans, upwards of a million, five-sixth the population of this capital city, nearly one out of every six persons on the island. Why are they here? Fidel Castro asked them. A graduate lawyer, Dr. Castro displays an elegance and personal dynamism that completely sways the enormous throng.

Victor Marchetti (CIA, 1955-69; Executive Assistant to the Deputy Director): I felt that we were grossly mishandling the national liberation movement and the emergence of national liberation leaders like Sukarno, Nasser, Nehru, and so forth throughout the world. I did not believe that we should be trying to overthrow these

people or assassinate these people but instead that we should have worked with them.

Caption: Castro Makes Appearance: US Properties Seized!

Michael Fitzmaurice (News of the Day Announcer): The ailing Premier of Cuba, Fidel Castro, emerges from his convalescence to address a youth congress and to announce that Cuba is expropriating United States- owned property in that country. The name is chiseled from the telephone building and signs torn down from this and other properties worth nearly a billion dollars. At the White House, Presidential News Secretary Hagerty announces a break in diplomatic relations with Cuba.

James C. Hagerty (White House Press Secretary, (1953-61): There is a limit to what the United States in self-respect can endure. That limit has now been reached.

Victor Marchetti (CIA, 1955-69; Executive Assistant to the Deputy Director): I am to this day absolutely convinced that we drove Fidel Castro into the arms of the Russian bear because he was frightened that we were going to murder him and destroy his new Cuba, and he was absolutely right.

Caption (in Spanish): Catastrophe!

Unidentified Cuban Newscaster (in Spanish): A French cargo ship, La Coubre, which had just docked with 76 tons of arms and ammunition for the revolutionary army, blew up as hundreds of workers unloaded the cargo. Seventy are dead and over three hundred wounded. Government sources have indicated that there is every reason to suspect sabotage.

William Colby (CIA, 1947-75; Director, 1973-75): The way it would start is maybe an ambassador, maybe a CIA officer, maybe somebody here in Washington, maybe somebody in the White House, would suggest that it would be a good idea to help a certain group in another country. That would be looked at to see if we had the contacts, reliable people we could deal with, and a plan would be put together as to how this would be done. That plan would then be approved within CIA as sensible. It would then be submitted to an interagency group and then submitted to the President for final okay. If it got the President's approval, then the Agency would go ahead.

Unidentified News of the Day Announcer: Forty-six were wounded and two killed under questionable circumstances. Castro, in a broadcast speech lasting most of the night, says bombs from US-based planes are responsible for the casualties. Other reports say it was men in cars. Whatever his reasons, Castro stirs strong feelings of anger against the United States.

James Wilcott (CIA, 1957-66): One of the operations they had was to burn the cane fields. As I understand it, the way it was done, they had people in frogman

suits. They would be taken out to the coast of Cuba, jump into the water with incendiary devices in their frogman outfits, come up on the beach, plant these incendiary devices in the cane fields, and swim back to the boat. They would be taken off and ten to fifteen minutes later the incendiary devices would go off and it would start a big fire in the cane fields.

Unidentified Cuban Newscasters (in Spanish): Fidel indicates that in the south in Pinar del Rio Province our radar detected a large ship launching smaller craft. The CIA is in direct control of these operations. It is the CIA which has been organizing the attacks, the infiltration of saboteurs, arms, and explosives. The CIA has been doing all this through people it has directly recruited.

Unidentified American Reporter (White House Press Conference, 12 April 1961): Has a decision been reached on how far this country would be willing to go in helping an anti-Castro uprising or invasion of Cuba?

John F. Kennedy (United States President, (1961-63): Well, first I want to say that there will not be under any condition an intervention in Cuba by United States Armed Forces. This government will do everything it possibly can. I think it is our responsibility to see that there are no Americans involved in any action inside Cuba.

David Atlee Phillips (CIA, 1954-75; Chief of Western Hemisphere Division): There is no question that American presidents have found it convenient to make an operation secret because that way it obviates the necessity for public debate. In many cases, it obviated the necessity for internal discussion in the Congress. Indeed, that is what led to the fiasco of the Bay of Pigs. "Gee, we have another big one to do and we will keep it secret too" when it could not be kept secret.

Caption: Rebels Invade Castro's Cuba!

Michael Fitzmaurice (News of the Day Announcer): Cuban revolutionary troops such as these have invaded Castro's leftist island fortress reportedly rallied by a mysterious, covert radio message: "Alert! Alert! Look over the rainbow! The fish will be running very soon!" From the sea and by parachute, the rebels have struck along the coast within ninety miles of Havana. Initial accounts of the fighting [are] sketchy, but strafing and bombing of communications and military targets [have been] reported with heavy casualties. Meanwhile in Havana, Acting Foreign Minister Olavares shows foreign envoys and newsmen scorched fragments of what may have been rockets fired during the B-26 raids. As might be expected, he points an accusing finger at the US. The same line is followed at a dramatic meeting of the United Nations General Assembly's Political Committee by Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa charging that his nation has been invaded by what he terms mercenaries from Guatemala and Florida. Quickly, forcefully, the charges are denied by chief US delegate Aldai E. Stevenson.

Adlai Ewing Stevenson, II (US Ambassador to the United Nations, 1961-65):

These charges are totally false, and I deny them categorically. The United States has committed no aggression against Cuba, and no offensive has been launched from Florida or from any other part of the United States.

Caption: Bay of Pigs (April 18, 1961).

David Atlee Phillips (CIA, 1954-75; Chief of Western Hemisphere Division): I had been stationed in Cuba on two separate occasions in 1955 and 1956 then I had returned in 1959. I was there in 1959 and 1960 before I had to leave rather abruptly. I had an affinity for Cuba. The Cuban people are marvelous. I had seen what was going on there and many of the participants in the Bay of Pigs were on that landing force because I had known them personally in Cuba, and I had recommended on a number of occasions that such and such a person would be a good man to have in the brigade so when that broadcast came from the beach and the leader said, "We are standing in the water and there is nothing else we can do," and he cursed. He cursed us. I felt he was cursing me, too.

Caption: Aftermath of the Cuban Episode!

Michael Fitzmaurice (News of the Day Announcer): [This is the] tragic epilogue to a gallant venture. Outside the Miami headquarters of the Cuban Revolutionary Front, exiled wives and mothers seek word of the men who participated in the ill-starred liberation invasion. For most, no news is bitter news, especially as in Havana, Fidel Castro in a four-hour television harangue shouts death for all seven hundred captives he claims taken in the abortive landing. Miles away in the serenity of Camp David, President Kennedy and former President Eisenhower confer on the repercussions of the Cuban episode. General Eisenhower promises bipartisan support for the President in this crisis as the President moves to the next round of the unceasing East-West power struggle over Cuba.

John F. Kennedy (United States President, (1961-63): I have said as much as I feel can be usefully said by me in regard to the events of the past few days. [A lack of] further statements [and] detailed discussion is not to conceal responsibility because I am the responsible officer of the government, but--that is quite obvious--but [it is] merely because I do not believe that such a discussion would benefit us, knowing the present, difficult situation [22 April 1961 Press Conference].

Frank Church (United States Senator, 1957-81; Chairman of Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, 1975-76): The Secretary gave us a crisp, clinical analysis of the death of the Cuban venture, but of course, no postmortem can revive a corpse.

David Atlee Phillips (CIA, 1954-75; Chief of Western Hemisphere Division): When the Bay of Pigs failed, I was sitting in the building on that night. Everyone knew that it was a failure and Robert Kennedy came in in his shirtsleeves and he had been sent there by his brother to clean that place out. He wanted to find out

what had gone wrong and do something about it. The result, however, was that Bobby Kennedy fell in love with the concept of clandestine operations. And we now know there is one question that has not been answered: Did President Kennedy and Bobby Kennedy know that there were assassination plans against Fidel Castro? It is an unanswered question. The one thing that I am absolutely sure of is that not only they knew, but [also] they wished for the continuance of that long period after the Bay of Pigs in which there was many actions taken against Cuba. To put it precisely, there was one point when Bobby Kennedy said, "When are you fellows going to get off your bottoms and do something about Fidel Castro?"

Richard Helms (CIA, 1947-73; Director, 1966-73): There were found some [things]: a suit, a wetsuit, a clamshell, various things that were on the shelf in the Agency that were regarded as things that might be used in possibly killing Castro or being used against him which never came off the shelf, were never used. If that is a plot to have created this, then I will back up and say that we ought to enumerate every single item that conceivably had to do with the invasions of Cuba, which we were constantly running. Under the Government aegis, we had taskforces, which were striking at Cuba constantly. We were attempting to blow up power plants. We were attempting to ruin sugar mills. We were attempting to do all kinds of things during this period. This is a matter of American Government policy. This was not the CIA. Do those things taper over into assassination plots? Maybe so [December 1978 Congressional Hearing].

Christopher Dodd (Democrat, Connecticut; 1975-81, Congressman; 1981-Present, Senator): Why did you not want to tell the Warren Commission or why did you not tell the Warren Commission about the efforts to get rid of Fidel Castro or to overthrow the Cuban government?

Richard Helms (CIA, 1947-73; Director, 1966-73): Bout Mr. Dodd, you are singling me out as to why I did not march up and tell the Warren Commission when these operations against Cuba were known to the Attorney General of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the President of the United States himself (although he at that point was dead). I mean all kinds of people knew about these operations high up in the government. Now why am I singled out as the fellow that should have gone up and identified a government operation to get rid of Castro--and it was a government-wide operation--supported by the Defense Department, supported by the National Security Council, supported by almost everybody in high position in the government?

McGeorge Bundy (1961-64, National Security Advisor): As far as I ever knew or know now, no one in the White House or at the Cabinet level ever gave any approval of any kind to any CIA effort to assassinate anyone. I told the Committee in particular that it is wholly inconsistent with what I know of President Kennedy and his brother Robert that either of them would ever have given any such order or authorization or consent to anyone through any channel.

Unidentified Reporter: You were head of the Agency during the time most of these operations occurred. What did you tell the Commission of assassination?

John McCone (CIA Director, 1961-65): Well, you know, I had no knowledge of it whatsoever. As you know, I stated that there was feasibility or lack of feasibility. There obviously were discussions of the question of whether such matters were being planned, but I had to plead ignorance because none were brought to my attention, and therefore I knew nothing of them.

Victor Marchetti (CIA, 1955-69; Executive Assistant to the Deputy Director): No President in his right mind is going to say, "Dear Director, I hereby order you to assassinate Fidel Castro." In fact, he will probably do the exact opposite. He will issue what is known in the trade as a "non-order" or a "non-directive". He will say, "We have these terrible problems down here in Cuba, and it is quite obvious to all of us that the key to it is Fidel Castro. Now, if we could just get rid of that person, maybe we could work out some kind of arrangement. Of course, we cannot do anything like that. That would be wrong, and so I do not know what we are going to do about it. We are just going to have to make the best of it and struggle along." Now, he is saying this (say) at a luncheon with McNamara and Rusk and maybe Helms or McCone (whoever was the Director at the time--it went over from McCone to Helms). Now these men are astute enough to know that what the President is really telling them is: "Get rid of Castro, but I am not going to put it in writing and I have already made a statement for the record that I am against it. In the event that anything ever goes wrong, I will be able to say, --Did I not tell you that would be wrong?"

Christopher Dodd (Democrat, Connecticut; 1975-81, Congressman; 1981-Present, Senator): Could you tell this Committee who the individuals were [who were] involving mafia chieftains or organized crime figures?

Richard Helms (CIA, 1947-73; Director, 1966-73): As far as I am aware on that particular situation, it was William K. Harvey who was in touch with John Roselli, and it was Harvey and Roselli who were attempting to find (if I understood it correctly) some channel from Florida into Havana. I also understand that there was a question of poison pills, which were supposed to be transported into Havana. There was never any evidence that they were ever transported there or ever left the United States. There was never any evidence that this plot ever left the Florida mainland, and if it was indeed an assassination plot, it was misadvertised to me because I had understood it was an effort to see if a connection could be made between the mafia in Florida and the mafia in Havana, and to the best of my knowledge, the connection was never made.

Robert Maheu (CIA Contract Agent): Sometime in 1960, during a period wherein for some previous years I had been doing work for the CIA, I was approached by my Project Officer, who asked me if (in connection with a planned invasion in

Cuba) I would contact a Mr. John Roselli. We started having meetings in Miami. During one of those meetings in Miami, I was introduced to a Mr. Sam Gold, who subsequently turned out to be Mr. Giancana [1975 Press Conference].

Victor Marchetti (CIA, 1955-69; Executive Assistant to the Deputy Director): In any dirty job such as paramilitary activities, assassinations, sabotage, and the like --what were known as special ops--almost invariably, the Agency direct involvement of the Agency officer (the career officer) ends in the planning stage and sometimes even before that in the policy/decision-making stage. The dirty work will be carried out by either contract agents, one-time agents, gangsters, mercenaries or whoever happens to be available, whatever assets are available at that moment.

Robert Maheu (CIA Contract Agent): We were told it was important in connection with the invasion of Cuba at that time to dispose of Mr. Castro and to the word dispose you can add anything you want.

Christopher Dodd (Democrat, Connecticut; 1975-81, Congressman; 1981-Present, Senator): It is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was shot, a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris and giving him an assassination device to be used against Castro. Now I read this and again I am reading the same report that we read from earlier. They are calling it an assassination device. Are we getting semantic here again?

Richard Helms (CIA, 1947-73; Director, 1966-73): I believe it was a hypodermic syringe they had given him with something called Black Leaf No. 40 in it. This was in response to Am-Lash's [CIA Agent Rolando Cubela Secades's] request that he be provided some sort of a device whereby he could kill Castro. He returned this device to the case officer. The case officer brought it back to Washington and that was the end of the plot.

Christopher Dodd (Democrat, Connecticut; 1975-81, Congressman; 1981-Present, Senator): Okay, but for purposes of discussion, the officer gave this Cuban, this agent in Paris, a device with that material you described which I presume if injected into a human being, would kill him? Is that correct?

Richard Helms (CIA, 1947-73; Director, 1966-73): I would think so. Yes.

Christopher Dodd (Democrat, Connecticut; 1975-81, Congressman; 1981-Present, Senator): So the agent gives the Cuban agent the device to kill somebody.

Richard Helms (CIA, 1947-73; Director, 1966-73): I am sorry he did not give him a pistol because that would have made the whole thing a lot simpler and less exotic.

Christopher Dodd (Democrat, Connecticut; 1975-81, Congressman; 1981-Present, Senator): Well, whether it is a pistol or a needle, if Am-Lash is a political

plot to destabilize the government, why in blazes are we giving an agent a device that would kill Castro if it were not an assassination plot?

Richard Helms (CIA, 1947-73; Director, 1966-73): Well, if you want to have it that way, why do you not just have it that way.

Christopher Dodd (Democrat, Connecticut; 1975-81, Congressman; 1981-Present, Senator): It is not a question of what I want.

Richard Helms (CIA, 1947-73; Director, 1966-73): Oh. I think it is what you want, Mr. Dodd.

Christopher Dodd (Democrat, Connecticut; 1975-81, Congressman; 1981-Present, Senator): Mr. Helms, I am reading to you from reports here, prepared at your request by the Inspector General.

Richard Helms (CIA, 1947-73; Director, 1966-73): I understand that.

Christopher Dodd (Democrat, Connecticut; 1975-81, Congressman; 1981-Present, Senator): I am not fabricating this. I am quoting.

Richard Helms (CIA, 1947-73; Director, 1966-73): I understand that.

Christopher Dodd (Democrat, Connecticut; 1975-81, Congressman; 1981-Present, Senator): It is not a question of what I want. It is a question of what this Committee would like to know, and the Committee is not satisfied, I do not believe, at this point as to what exactly the characterization of Am-Lash was.

Richard Helms (CIA, 1947-73; Director, 1966-73): Well, I told you what I believe the characterization of Am-Lash to be.

Christopher Dodd (Democrat, Connecticut; 1975-81, Congressman; 1981-Present, Senator): Well, how does that jibe with this?

Richard Helms (CIA, 1947-73; Director, 1966-73): If you want to--. If, because we gave him a gun or a hypodermic syringe or whatever the case might be at his request because he had aims on Castro, if that is your definition of an assassination plot, then have it that way. That is quite satisfactory with me.

Unidentified Interviewer: Do you not open yourself to blackmail? In other words, if you are involved in some covert operation and you are using elements like (for instance) the mafia (as in some of the assassination attempts against Castro), is that not really a very dangerous thing to get involved in?

David Atlee Phillips (CIA, 1954-75; Chief of Western Hemisphere Division): You bet it is. It is very, very tricky: the mafia. Are you not getting into trouble when you use them during World War II (as we now recently read, we used them in New

York City)? I had only known that we had used them in Marseille, on the docks there. Of course, it is attributed. It is a part of the evaluation that a good intelligence officer and a good policy maker would make in deciding whether to use any person or any instrument or any political organization. There is no question that it is very tricky.

Victor Marchetti (CIA, 1955-69; Executive Assistant to the Deputy Director):

The incentive that the Agency has (where dirty work is done by contract people or one-time hirees and so forth) [is] obviously if anything goes wrong they can be disavowed. If the person turns bad, turns sour, and may want to speak out and may possibly have some credibility and/or evidence (well) then stronger action is called for, and you can have the ultimate termination of the agent.

Unidentified Police Spokesperson (Chicago, 1975): When the police arrived, they found Mr. Giancana lying on the floor dead. [He had] been shot numerous times in the upper part of his body and throat. Approximately six shots [are] believed to have been fired from a .22 caliber weapon.

Unidentified Reporter (Chicago, 1975): Is there anything to support the theory that Giancana's killing may have been in some way connected with his involvement in an alleged CIA plot to assassinate Fidel Castro?

Unidentified Police Spokesperson (Chicago, 1975): We know nothing about that. We have nothing to lead us to believe that at all.

William Colby (CIA, 1947-75; Director, 1973-75): One of the conclusions the Senate came to after eight months of study--one of the conclusions--was that no foreign leader had ever been assassinated by CIA. It was not for want of trying in Castro's case, of course, but that is the only case in which there was any substantial effort made against one. And yet I think, the world as a whole thinks CIA was around trying to assassinate everybody, and that is just plain false.

Caption: Lumumba Arrest Stirs New Crisis in the Congo!

Michael Fitzmaurice (News of the Day Announcer): Patrice Lumumba comes back to Leopoldville a prisoner. The former Congo Premier, who was captured when he fled inland, no longer wears the tuft of whiskers on his chin that helped to identify him. His arrest provokes several clashes between Lumumba followers and Congolese army troops, but Congo's strongman Colonel Joseph Mobutu, shown as he watches Lumumba arrive, says he is prepared to put down any uprising. Mobutu enjoys the sight of Lumumba being tied up more firmly for transfer to the garrison town of Peaceville. A soldier tries to stuff into Lumumba's mouth a crumpled speech asserting his claim to power. The former Premier shows no emotion. It may be the end of a chapter but not yet the end of the Congo story.

John Stockwell (CIA, 1964-77): In training, down at Camp Perry at "The Farm," a CIA officer, a middle-grade officer at that time, was telling us about his career, and one of the things he threw out to illustrate the adventures you get into was finding yourself in Lubumbashi in the Katanga with Lumumba's body in the back in the trunk of your car driving around town trying to figure out what to do with it.

Frank Church (United States Senator, 1957-81; Chairman of Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, 1975-76): One of Mr. Lumumba's weaknesses was his propensity to turn matters over to the Soviet Union. I would think that his death, unless it results in a kind of Marxism that might prove useful to the Russians, would be regarded as a blow to their interests.

John Stockwell (CIA, 1964-77): The CIA had developed a program to assassinate Lumumba under Devlin's encouragement and management. The program they developed (the operation) did not work. They did not follow through on it. It was to give poison to Lumumba, and they could not find a setting in which to get the poison to him successfully in a way that it would not appear to be a CIA operation. I mean you could not invite him to a cocktail party and give him a drink and have him die a short time later (obviously). And so they gave up on it. They got cold feet and instead they handled it by the Chief of Station talking to Mobutu about the threat that Lumumba posed and Mobutu going out and killing Lumumba, having his men kill Lumumba.

Unidentified Interviewer: What about the CIA's relationship with Mobutu? Were they paying him money?

John Stockwell (CIA, 1964-77): Yes, indeed. I was there in 1968 when Chief of Station told the story about having been the day before that day having gone to make payment to Mobutu of cash (\$25,000.00) and Mobutu saying, "Keep the money. I do not need it." By then of course, Mobutu's European bank account was so huge that \$25,000.00 was nothing to him.

Philip Agee (CIA, 1959-69): The CIA works through the reactionary forces essentially or the middle-road England, social democratic forces (whichever ones they are trying to support). They work through these people. In the CIA, there is a distinction made between the career, US-citizen employees--like I was--that is the officers and staff and the people who actually do the work at the end of the line who are the agents.

Joseph Burkholder Smith (CIA, 1951-73): An agent is a person, who is recruited and hired to perform a specific intelligence or covert action task in a particular area at a particular moment in time, and so he is or she is an indigenous person.

James Wilcott (CIA, 1957-66): One time in particular, the Chief of China Branch had come to my window to draw funds, and he was drawing funds for death benefits for a person by the name of Dave, who had been sent to China as an agent. And he

said, "Well, we lost another body today." And I said, "Well, this seems like a very callous way to talk about a human life." And he said, "Well, Jim, we cannot let our emotions interfere with our operational effectiveness."

John Stockwell (CIA, 1964-77): One of my favorite agents, a charming individual who looked and acted as a matter of fact very much like Flip Wilson, quite talented and just a pleasure and a delight to be around. I left the country (re-assigned) and a week or two later, he was executed (shot by the police). They just picked him up and shot him without trial and he would not have been shot if he had not been working for me during this period of time.

Joseph Burkholder Smith (CIA, 1951-73): The situation that an intelligence officer faces when he attempts to get someone to serve the interests of the United States rather than the interests of his own country is precisely the kind of thing that a con man is doing when he is working on a mark. The only person who does not know what the game is when con men are working is the mark. The only person who really does not know what the game is in an intelligence recruitment is the target of that recruitment.

David Atlee Phillips (CIA, 1954-75; Chief of Western Hemisphere Division): Some of the jobs in intelligence are ones which can best be performed by people who are themselves a little deviant so that they could get at the root of the matter. If you wanted to invite a dozen people to spend the rest of your life with you on a desert island, I would not suggest that you invite a bunch of spies. But I believe someone has to do intelligence work, so I did it.