



Foreign Relations of the  
United States, 1950–1955

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# The Intelligence Community 1950–1955

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explained, it was indicated that operations are well advanced to inform the authorities of the International Geophysical Year<sup>7</sup> of this activity as a means of mapping cloud formations (which is, in fact, all that most photographs will show.)<sup>8</sup>

AJG

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<sup>7</sup> The International Geophysical Year was scheduled to begin July 1, 1957, with worldwide scientific observations of earth and astronomical phenomena. It would continue for one and a half years.

<sup>8</sup> President Eisenhower was given a technical briefing on December 27. On the next day Secretary Dulles told Fisher Howe that those attending the briefing included Secretary Dulles, General Twining, Trevor Gardner, and an aide to Secretary of Defense Wilson. The Secretary indicated at the briefing that the British had given their go ahead on December 25, and the President approved the operation subject to “certain modifications,” which included slowing down the rate of launching, extending the time period of the operation, and resubmission of the program to Secretary Dulles to whom the President “delegated authority for the final decision and triggering of the operation.” (Memorandum by Fisher Howe, December 28; National Archives, RG 59, INR Files: Lot 61 D 67, Genetrix) Another account of this December 27 briefing is in a telegram from Bergquist to General LeMay, December 28. (Ibid.)

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## 250. National Security Council Directive<sup>1</sup>

NSC 5412/2

Washington, undated.

### COVERT OPERATIONS

1. The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the vicious covert activities of the USSR and Communist China and the governments, parties and groups dominated by them (hereinafter collectively referred to as “International Communism”) to discredit and defeat the aims and activities of the United States and other powers of the free world, determined, as set forth in NSC directives 10/2<sup>2</sup> and 10/5,<sup>3</sup> that, in the interests of world peace and U.S. national security, the overt

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Special Assistant to President for National Security Affairs Records, President’s Papers. Top Secret. This directive was transmitted to the NSC under cover of a December 28 note from NSC Executive Secretary Lay. Lay stated that the President had approved the directive on the same date.

<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, Document 292.

<sup>3</sup> Document 90.

foreign activities of the U.S. Government should be supplemented by covert operations.

2. The Central Intelligence Agency had already been charged by the National Security Council with conducting espionage and counter-espionage operations abroad. It therefore seemed desirable, for operational reasons, not to create a new agency for covert operations, but, subject to directives from the NSC, to place the responsibility for them on the Central Intelligence Agency and correlate them with espionage and counter-espionage operations under the over-all control of the Director of Central Intelligence.

3. The NSC has determined that such covert operations shall to the greatest extent practicable, in the light of U.S. and Soviet capabilities and taking into account the risk of war, be designed to:

a. Create and exploit troublesome problems for International Communism, impair relations between the USSR and Communist China and between them and their satellites, complicate control within the USSR, Communist China and their satellites, and retard the growth of the military and economic potential of the Soviet bloc.

b. Discredit the prestige and ideology of International Communism, and reduce the strength of its parties and other elements.

c. Counter any threat of a party or individuals directly or indirectly responsive to Communist control to achieve dominant power in a free world country.

d. Reduce International Communist control over any areas of the world.

e. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the peoples and nations of the free world, accentuate, wherever possible, the identity of interest between such peoples and nations and the United States as well as favoring, where appropriate, those groups genuinely advocating or believing in the advancement of such mutual interests, and increase the capacity and will of such peoples and nations to resist International Communism.

f. In accordance with established policies and to the extent practicable in areas dominated or threatened by International Communism, develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and guerrilla operations and ensure availability of those forces in the event of war, including wherever practicable provision of a base upon which the military may expand these forces in time of war within active theaters of operations as well as provision for stay-behind assets and escape and evasion facilities.

4. Under the authority of Section 102(d)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby directs that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for:

a. Ensuring, through designated representatives of the Secretary of State and of the Secretary of Defense, that covert operations are planned and conducted in a manner consistent with United States foreign and military policies and with overt activities, and consulting with and obtaining advice from the Operations Coordinating Board and other departments or agencies as appropriate.

b. Informing, through appropriate channels and on a need-to-know basis, agencies of the U.S. Government, both at home and abroad (including diplomatic and military representatives), of such operations as will affect them.

5. In addition to the provisions of paragraph 4, the following provisions shall apply to wartime covert operations:

a. Plans for covert operations to be conducted in active theaters of war and any other areas in which U.S. forces are engaged in combat operations will be drawn up with the assistance of the Department of Defense and will be in consonance with and complementary to approved war plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Covert operations in active theaters of war and any other areas in which U.S. forces are engaged in combat operations will be conducted under such command and control relationships as have been or may in the future be approved by the Department of Defense.

6. As used in this directive, “covert operations” shall be understood to be all activities conducted pursuant to this directive which are so planned and executed that any U.S. Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the U.S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them. Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities related to: propaganda; political action; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition; escape and evasion and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states or groups including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups; support of indigenous and anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world; deception plans and operations; and all activities compatible with this directive necessary to accomplish the foregoing. Such operations shall not include: armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage and counter-espionage, nor cover and deception for military operations.

7. Except as the President otherwise directs, designated representatives of the Secretary of State and of the Secretary of Defense of the rank of Assistant Secretary or above, and a representative of the President designated for this purpose, shall hereafter be advised in advance of major covert programs initiated by CIA under this policy or as otherwise directed, and shall be the normal channel for giving policy approval for such programs as well as for securing coordination of support therefor among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA.

8. This directive supersedes and rescinds NSC 10/2, NSC 10/5, NSC 5412,<sup>4</sup> NSC 5412/1,<sup>5</sup> and subparagraphs “a” and “b” under the

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<sup>4</sup> Document 171.

<sup>5</sup> Document 212.

heading “Additional Functions of the Operations Coordinating Board” on page 1 of the President’s memorandum for the Executive Secretary, National Security Council, supplementing Executive Order 10483.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Document 157.

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**251. Paper Prepared by J. Patrick Coyne of the National Security Council Staff<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated.

Report on Intelligence Activities in the Federal Government  
Prepared for the Commission on Organization of the Executive  
Branch of the Government  
By the Task Force on Intelligence Activities

CHAPTER I—Brief History of U.S. Foreign Intelligence Activities  
(Pages 1–12)

This Chapter contains no recommendations.

CHAPTER II—The Central Intelligence Agency (Pages 13–75)

*Recommendation 1* (page 72): That “covert intelligence” and “cold war” functions of the current DD/P be assigned to separate Deputy Directors whose areas of responsibility shall be administratively and logistically self-supporting. (A minority of the Task Force members did not concur in this recommendation, believing that “covert intelligence” and “cold war” operations should be under the staff and operating control of a single operating Deputy Director—as at present.)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Records of White House Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 13, Hoover Commission Report on Intelligence Activities, May 1955–October 1956. Top Secret. President Eisenhower had referred the classified Clark Task Force Report (Document 221), along with departmental and agency comments on applicable sections of it, to Dillon Anderson, the President’s Special Assistant, on December 15 for further action and recommendations as appropriate. This report is Coyne’s compilation of the departmental and agency responses, including his added “Additional Action Required” and “Observations,” which he completed in early 1956. (Memorandum from Anderson to Goodpaster, February 14, 1956; Eisenhower Library, Hoover Commission Report on Intelligence Activities, May 1955–October 1956, and memorandum from Coyne to NSC Executive Secretary Lay, January 20, 1956; *ibid.*) Some documentation on departmental and agency responses to the Clark Task Force Report are *ibid.* and in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 711.52 and 711.5200. All ellipses in the original.