[](https://wikileaks.org/the-gifiles.html)

On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing *The Global Intelligence Files*, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

**The Art of Naming Operations**

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[**http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/1995/sieminsk.htm**](http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/1995/sieminsk.htm)  
  
  
GREGORY C. SIEMINSKI  
  
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>From /Parameters/, Autumn 1995, pp. 81-98.  
  
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Shortly after word spread among key military leaders that President Bush  
had ordered the invasion of Panama, Lieutenant General Thomas Kelly,  
Operations Officer on the Joint Staff, received a call from General  
James Lindsay, Commander-in-Chief (CINC), Special Operations Command.  
His call did not concern some last-minute change in the invasion plan;  
rather, it concerned a seemingly insignificant detail of the operation:  
its name. "Do you want your grandchildren to say you were in Blue  
Spoon?" he asked.[1] Lieutenant General Kelly agreed that the name  
should be changed. After hanging up the phone, General Kelly discussed  
alternatives with his deputy for current operations, Brigadier General  
Joe Lopez.  
  
"How about Just Action?" Kelly offered.  
  
"How about Just Cause?" Lopez shot back.[2]  
  
So was born the recent trend in nicknaming operations. Since 1989, major  
US military operations have been nicknamed with an eye toward shaping  
domestic and international perceptions about the activities they  
describe.[3] Operation Just Cause is only the most obvious example of  
this phenomenon. From names that stress an operation's humanitarian  
focus, like Operation Provide Comfort in Turkey, to ones that stress an  
operation's restoration of democratic authority, like Operation Uphold  
Democracy in Haiti, it is evident that the military has begun to  
recognize the power of names in waging a public relations campaign, and  
the significance of winning that campaign to the overall effort. As  
Major General Charles McClain, Chief of Public Affairs for the Army, has  
recently written, "the perception of an operation can be as important to  
success as the execution of that operation."[4] Professor Ray Eldon  
Hiebert, in a piece titled, "Public Relations as a Weapon of Modern  
War," elaborates on that view: "The effective use of words and media  
today . . . is just as important as the effective use of bullets and  
bombs. In the end, it is no longer enough just to be strong. Now it is  
necessary to communicate. To win a war today government not only has to  
win on the battlefield, it must also win the minds of its public."[5]  
  
Like any aspect of operational planning, the job of naming operations  
initially falls to mid-level staff officers in Defense Department  
components, agencies, and unified and specified commands, to which the  
Joint Chiefs of Staff have delegated considerable freedom in the naming  
of operations. Because nicknames help determine the way operations are  
perceived, joint staff officers must develop not only their skill as  
operational artists but also their art as operation namers.  
  
An appreciation for the art of doing anything is best gained from  
practitioners, both good and bad. By way of offering a sort of  
historical apprenticeship, this article reviews the origins and  
development of the practice of naming operations, with particular  
emphasis upon the American tradition which emerged from World War II.  
This heretofore unchronicled story contains useful lessons for officers  
who must recommend or approve an operation name.  
  
\*Operations in the World Wars\*  
  
Naming operations seems to have originated with the German General Staff  
during the last two years of World War I. The Germans used code names  
primarily to preserve operational security, though the names were also a  
convenient way of referring to subordinate and successive operations.  
Thus, it is probably no accident that operational names came into use at  
the same time as the rise of operational art. It was simply easier to  
get a handle on the complexities of operational sequencing and  
synchronization by naming each operation something that the staff could  
remember. The Germans chose names that were not only memorable but also  
inspiring. Plans for the great Western Front offensive in the spring of  
1918, which saw the most extensive use of operational code names,  
borrowed from religious, medieval, and mythological sources: Archangel,  
St. Michael, St. George, Roland, Mars, Achilles, Castor, Pollux, and  
Valkyrie.[6] The selection of these names was perhaps an adjunct to  
Ludendorff's patriotic education program, designed to stir a demoralized  
and weary army into making one final push.[7] The original, stirring  
vision conjured by these names was lost, however, when several of the  
planned operations had to be scaled back. St. George, for example,  
devolved to the uninspiring diminutive Georgette.[8]  
  
The American military adopted code names during the World War II era,  
primarily for security reasons.[9] Its use of code names for operations  
grew out of the practice of color-coding war plans during the interwar  
period.[10] Even before America entered the war, the War Department had  
executed Operation Indigo,[11] the reinforcement of Iceland, and had  
dubbed plans to occupy the Azores and Dakar as Operations Gray[12] and  
Black[13] respectively.  
  
With the outbreak of the war, the practice of using colors as code names  
was overcome by the need to code-name not only a growing number of  
operations, but also numerous locations and projects. The War Department  
adopted a code word list similar in principle to one already in use by  
the British. In early 1942, members of the War Plans Division culled  
words from an unabridged dictionary to come up with a list of 10,000  
common nouns and adjectives that were not suggestive of operational  
activities or locations. They avoided proper nouns, geographical terms,  
and names of ships.[14] Since so many operations would involve the  
British, they made sure the list did not conflict with the one developed  
and managed by their counterparts on the British Inter-Services Security  
Board.[15] In March 1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the  
classified Inter-Services Code-Word Index[16] and gave the War Plans  
Division the duty of assigning code words.[17] Accordingly, the War  
Plans Division (shortly afterward renamed the Operations Division)[18]  
assigned blocks of code words to each theater; the European Theater got  
such names as Market and Garden, while the Pacific Theater got names  
like Olympic and Flintlock.[19]  
  
Although the words listed in the British and American code indexes were  
randomly chosen, the names of significant operations were thoughtfully  
selected from the lists, at least those Winston Churchill had anything  
to do with. Churchill was fascinated with code names and personally  
selected them for all major operations.[20] He had clear ideas about  
what constituted appropriate names. After coming across several that he  
considered inappropriate, he went so far as to instruct an aide to  
submit all future code names to him for approval; he dropped his demand  
when he learned the magnitude of the task,[21] but he did take the  
precaution of writing down some principles to guide his subordinates:  
  
[1.] Operations in which large numbers of men may lose their lives  
ought not to be described by code words which imply a boastful or  
overconfident sentiment,. . . or, conversely, which are calculated  
to invest the plan with an air of despondency. . . . They ought not  
to be names of a frivolous character. . . . They should not be  
ordinary words often used in other connections. . . . Names of  
living people--Ministers and Commanders--should be avoided. . . .  
  
2. After all, the world is wide, and intelligent thought will  
readily supply an unlimited number of well-sounding names which do  
not suggest the character of the operation or disparage it in any  
way and do not enable some widow or mother to say that her son was  
killed in an operation called "Bunnyhug" or "Ballyhoo."[22]  
  
Borrowing a page from the Germans of World War I, whose code-naming  
practices he knew well from writing his four-volume history of that  
war,[23] Churchill saw the names of culturally significant figures as  
useful sources of operational code words:  
  
3. Proper names are good in this field. The heroes of antiquity,  
figures from Greek and Roman mythology, the constellations and  
stars, famous racehorses, names of British and American war heroes,  
could be used, provided they fall within the rules above.[24]  
  
Churchill's commonsense principles for naming operations influenced  
American as well as British practice. For example, he objected to the  
code name for the American bomber raid on the Romanian oil fields in  
Ploesti because he thought the name "Soapsuds" was "inappropriate for an  
operation in which so many brave Americans would risk or lose their  
lives."[25] He aired his objections through the British Chiefs of Staff,  
who persuaded the Joint Chiefs of Staff to change the name to the more  
appropriate and inspirational Tidal Wave.[26] Churchill's hand also is  
evident in the naming of many combined US-British operations, including  
the American-led invasion of Normandy. The plan for the 1944 invasion  
was originally Roundhammer, a combination of the code names for  
invasions planned for previous years, Sledgehammer (1942) and Roundup  
(1943).[27] While Churchill's personal response to the name Roundhammer  
is not recorded, the British official history of the war calls the name  
a "revolting neologism."[28] Whether this strong reaction was shared by  
Churchill or not, he changed the name to Overlord,[29] deservedly the  
best-known operational code name to emerge from World War II.[30] The  
name suggests, as David Kahn has noted, "a sense of majesty and  
patriarchal vengeance and irresistible power."[31] Whether or not  
Churchill violated his own advice about avoiding names which imply  
overconfidence, the name Overlord may well have strengthened the resolve  
of those who planned the assault on fortress Europe.  
  
The Axis powers also recognized the inspirational value of code names.  
Although the Japanese typically numbered or alphabetically designated  
their operations,[32] they resorted to inspirational names as their  
strategic situation worsened, not unlike the Germans during World War I.  
The Japanese offensive designed to thwart the Allied landings at Leyte  
Gulf, for example, was optimistically dubbed Operation Victory.[33]  
  
The Germans made extensive use of code names for plans and operations  
and usually chose names at random; however, major operations often got  
special consideration by the German leadership.[34] Perhaps the most  
well-known example of this is the code name for the 1941 invasion of the  
Soviet Union. Initially, the operation was christened Fritz, after the  
son of the plan's author, Colonel Bernhard Von Lossberg.[35] But Hitler  
would not have his grand project named something so pedestrian,  
Lossberg's sentimental attachment notwithstanding. On 11 December 1940  
he renamed the operation Barbarossa, the folk name of the 12th-century  
Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I, who had extended German authority over  
the Slavs in the east and who, legend said, would rise again to  
establish a new German Empire.[36] In selecting a name with these  
inspirational associations, Hitler risked revealing his intentions--the  
very thing code names are designed to conceal. In the case of  
Barbarossa, Hitler seems to have been lucky; in the case of Operation  
Sealion, his planned invasion of Britain, he was not. British  
intelligence divined Sealion's target from its telltale name.[37]  
  
\*Using Nicknames to Shape Perceptions\*  
  
The efforts of Hitler and Churchill notwithstanding, World War II  
operation names had limited effect on shaping attitudes because they  
were classified until after the war ended.[38] Thus, their effect on  
troop morale was limited to those with clearances, and their effect on  
public perception was delayed until after the war, at which point the  
names were merely historical curiosities.  
  
But in America, shortly after the war ended, the War Department decided  
to use operation names for public information purposes in connection  
with atomic bomb testing. To this end, the War Department created a new  
category of unclassified operation names, which are known as nicknames  
to distinguish them from classified code words. Code words are assigned  
a classified meaning and are used to safeguard classified plans and  
operations, while nicknames are assigned unclassified meanings and are  
used for administrative, morale, and public information purposes.[39]  
  
Nicknames offered new possibilities for shaping attitudes about  
operations, and the first person to make use of one took full advantage  
of the potential. Vice Admiral W. H. P. Blandy, the commander of the  
joint task force conducting the 1946 atomic bomb tests on Bikini Atoll,  
selected the nickname Operation Crossroads with great care. He chose it,  
he told a Senate committee, because of the test's possible  
significance--"that seapower, airpower, and perhaps humanity itself . .  
. were at the crossroads."[40] Admiral Blandy was especially proud of  
the name, and when he discovered that the word was already assigned to  
another activity, he pulled strings to get it assigned to the Bikini  
tests.[41]  
  
The press publicized not only the name, but also Blandy's rationale for  
selecting it, and did so with general approbation.[42] Commenting on  
Blandy's public relations savvy, one historian wrote: "The choice of  
names was brilliant, implying to some that the military was unsure of  
its direction and was truly in awe of the atomic bomb."[43] However,  
some in the press were not so enamored with Blandy or his choice of  
name. In an article lampooning Blandy, /The New Yorker/ commented with  
unmistakable sarcasm that the name "has been greatly admired in literary  
and non-violent circles."[44] The sarcasm seems to suggest that while  
the general public might admire the name, literary and non-violent  
audiences were not taken in by Blandy's public relations methods. This  
would not be the last time members of the media would resent the  
military's success in popularizing a carefully chosen nickname.  
  
\*Operations in Korea\*  
  
Although the military had learned the value of well-chosen nicknames  
during the peacetime atomic bomb tests, it continued to use meaningless  
code names during wartime to protect operational security. At least this  
was true early in the Korean War. In planning the Inchon landing,  
General Douglas MacArthur and his subordinates followed the World War II  
practice of selecting operation names from an established code word  
list. The earliest plan was dubbed Operation Bluehearts, and the one  
actually executed was Operation Chromite.[45]  
  
MacArthur did depart from World War II practice in one important  
respect: he permitted code names to be declassified and disseminated to  
the press once operations had begun, rather than waiting until the end  
of the war.[46] Thus, combat operation names were, for the first time,  
public knowledge as operations unfolded. Curiously, MacArthur, with all  
his public relations savvy, failed to see the opportunities this offered  
for shaping perceptions.  
  
China's intervention in the Korean War helped Lieutenant General Matthew  
Ridgway see what MacArthur had not. Ridgway took command of the Eighth  
Army as it was reeling southward under relentless Chinese attack. His  
first task, he realized, was to restore the fighting spirit of his badly  
demoralized command.[47] One way he did this was by giving decidedly  
aggressive nicknames to the series of counteroffensives undertaken from  
February to April 1951: Thunderbolt, Roundup, Killer, Ripper,  
Courageous, Audacious, and Dauntless. Because these names were not  
classified once operations began, they were widely disseminated among  
Eighth Army soldiers to boost morale.[48] Ridgway's unprecedented use of  
meaningful combat operation names set the tone for one of the most  
remarkable transformations of any military organization in history. The  
reinvigorated Eighth Army pushed the Chinese back to the 38th parallel.  
  
If Ridgway's names contributed to success on the battlefield, they were  
not nearly so successful on the home front. Ridgway had publicly  
announced not only the start of his first major counteroffensive, but  
also its nickname: Operation Killer.[49] In doing so, he may have  
imagined that he could boost the morale of the public in the same way he  
hoped to inspire his troops. After all, the news from the front had been  
bad for months--so bad, in fact, that the US Far East Command had  
suspended communiques dealing with operational matters the previous  
fall.[50] It was probably no coincidence that the communiques resumed  
the day after the start of Operation Killer.[51] Certainly some of  
Ridgway's troops thought that Killer and other names had been chosen  
with the media in mind.[52]  
  
In any event, more than a few observers objected to Ridgway's operation  
name, which was prominently displayed in many newspaper and magazine  
articles.[53] One critic was the Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton  
Collins, who informed Ridgway that "the word `killer' . . . struck an  
unpleasant note as far as public relations was concerned."[54] Certainly  
public relations suffered: several writers criticized the name directly  
or implicitly in letters to /The New York Times/;[55] the International  
Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union issued a report in which the  
name served as the rubric for the entire conflict, which it called a  
"phony" war emergency;[56] Republicans pointed to the term as evidence  
that the Truman Administration had no other aim in Korea but to kill  
Chinese;[57] and the State Department objected that the name had soured  
negotiations with the People's Republic of China.[58]  
  
While the incident taught Ridgway "how varied . . . the political  
pressures [can be in waging] . . . a major war,"[59] he remained  
unrepentant about his selection of the name: "I am not convinced that  
the country should not be told that war means killing. I am by nature  
opposed to any effort to `sell' war to people as an only mildly  
unpleasant business that requires very little in the way of blood."[60]  
However opposed his nature may have been to soft-pedaling the realities  
of war, operations after Killer and its immediate successor, Ripper,  
were given less bloody names.  
  
\*Operations in Vietnam\*  
  
Early in the Vietnam War, operations were often given nicknames  
descriptive of the missions they designated. For example, a combined US  
Marine and South Vietnamese operation designed to increase the area of  
control of the Marine enclave at Da Nang was dubbed Blastout.[61] The  
names of air operations in early 1966 suggest the widening of the air  
war against North Vietnam. The two retaliatory air strikes against  
carefully selected North Vietnamese installations were known as Flaming  
Dart I and II, while the gradually escalating strategic bombing effort  
begun shortly thereafter was known as Rolling Thunder.[62]  
  
The penchant for giving descriptive names to operations in Vietnam  
caused the military to relearn the lesson of Operation Killer. On 25  
January 1966, the 1st Cavalry Division began a sweep operation through  
the Bong Son Plain which it had dubbed Masher,[63] presumably because  
the operation envisioned the enemy being mashed against a second force  
comprised of Marines.[64] Owing to the media's free access to military  
units and the lack of censorship during the war, nicknames like Masher  
were frequently reported by the media as operations progressed. And  
because Masher was a major operation conducted by the novel "airmobile  
cavalry" division, it attracted a fair degree of media attention,  
causing the name to be widely circulated on television and in the print  
media.[65] When President Johnson heard it, he angrily protested that it  
did not reflect "pacification emphasis."[66] General William  
Westmoreland put it more bluntly when he speculated that "President  
Johnson . . . objected . . . because the connotation of violence  
provided a focus for carping war critics."[67] To remove their focus,  
the division commander quickly renamed the operation White Wing.[68]  
  
The lesson of the Masher incident was not lost on Westmoreland: "We  
later used names of American cities, battles, or historic figures [for  
operations]."[69] Indeed, reading the names of operations mounted in  
Vietnam after February 1966 is like reading a cross between a gazetteer  
and a history book.[70] Names such as Junction City, Bastogne, and  
Nathan Hale were imbued with American associations and values, and thus  
were politically safe, as well as potentially inspirational.  
  
Like Ridgway, Westmoreland tried his own hand at the art of operational  
naming. Also like Ridgway, he did so to inspire demoralized soldiers. In  
early 1968, the garrison of 6000 US and South Vietnamese troops at Khe  
Sanh found itself surrounded by an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 North  
Vietnamese regulars. Many critics saw a Dien Bien Phu in the making, and  
the beleaguered troops could not but be infected by the prevailing sense  
of doom. To combat their dispiriting mood, Westmoreland named the  
round-the-clock bombing and shelling of enemy positions Operation  
Niagara. He selected the name, he said, "to invoke an image of cascading  
shells and bombs," an image obviously designed to reassure the Khe Sanh  
garrison.[71]  
  
As the Vietnam War drew to a close, the Department of Defense for the  
first time issued guidelines concerning nicknaming operations.[72] It is  
clear from reading the guidelines--which remain in force today[73]--that  
its authors learned well the lessons of Operations Killer and Masher.  
Noting that improperly selected nicknames "can be counterproductive,"  
the regulation specifies that nicknames must not: "express a degree of  
bellicosity inconsistent with traditional American ideals or current  
foreign policy"; "convey connotations offensive to good taste or  
derogatory to a particular group, sect, or creed"; "convey connotations  
offensive to [US] allies or other Free World nations"; or employ "exotic  
words, trite expressions, or well-known commercial trademarks."[74] The  
regulation further stipulates that a nickname must consist of two words  
(which helps distinguish it from a code word, which consists of only  
one) and requires the JCS to establish procedures for DOD components to  
nominate and report nicknames.[75]  
  
\*Post-Vietnam Automation\*  
  
In 1975, the JCS implemented these guidelines by establishing a computer  
system to fully automate the maintenance and reconciliation of  
nicknames, code words, and exercise terms.[76] The computer system,  
called the Code Word, Nickname, and Exercise Term System (an unwieldy  
name shortened to NICKA), is still in operation today and can be  
accessed through the Worldwide Military Command and Control System. The  
NICKA system is not, as some assume, a random word generator for  
nicknames; it is, in fact, merely an automated means for submitting,  
validating, and storing them. The authority to create nicknames rests  
not with those who manage the NICKA system, but with 24 DOD components,  
agencies, and unified and specified commands.[77] JCS assigns each of  
these organizations a series of two-letter alphabetic sequences and  
requires that the first word of each two-word nickname begin with a  
letter pair from one of the sequences.[78] For example, the US Atlantic  
Command (USACOM) is assigned six two-letter alphabetic sequences: AG-AL,  
ES-EZ, JG-JL, QA-QF, SM-SR, and UM-UR.[79] Selecting the letter pair UR  
from the last of these sequences, a staff officer recommended the  
nickname Urgent Fury for the 1983 invasion of Grenada.  
  
Clearly, staff officers in DOD components, agencies, and unified and  
specified commands have considerable freedom in creating nicknames,  
certainly far more than their Vietnam-era predecessors. There is, and  
has been for 20 years, plenty of room for artistry in naming operations.  
  
In the first 15 years of the new system's existence, however, there was  
little attempt to exploit the power of nicknaming to improve either  
troop morale or public and international relations. Nicknames used from  
1975 through 1988 were generally meaningless word pairs similar to the  
operation names used during World War II: Eldorado Canyon (the 1986  
Libya raid), Praying Mantis (the 1988 air strikes targeting Iranian  
naval vessels and oil platforms), and Golden Pheasant (a 1988 show of  
force to deter Nicaraguan violations of Honduran territory). When  
nicknames were chosen purposefully, as in the case of Urgent Fury, the  
effect was overdone.[80] Undoubtedly, the staff officer who came up with  
"Urgent Fury" was intent on inspiring the troops executing the mission,  
but he failed to consider the reaction of the media and general public.  
The name, which was divulged to the press shortly after the  
invasion,[81] only fueled the arguments of critics who accused the  
military of excess in committing so much combat power to the  
operation[82]--which, one wag suggested, "the New York Police Department  
could have won."[83] Another critic implied that the name belied the  
rationale for the invasion. Urgent Fury sounded "too militant," he  
suggested; if we had really been provoked into invading the tiny island  
nation, then why not "Reluctant Necessity"?[84]  
  
Undoubtedly one reason for the military's failure to use operation names  
to improve public relations was the strained relationship that existed  
between the military and the media during this 15-year period. Many in  
the military blamed the loss of the Vietnam War on the media's critical  
reporting, which, it was argued, soured the American public's will to  
continue the fight. Nowhere is this attitude toward the media more  
evident than in Urgent Fury, where Vice Admiral Metcalf initially  
refused to allow the media access to the combat zone. The motive for  
this restriction was transparent:  
  
Shutting the press out of Grenada was . . . based on a fear that an  
unrestrained press might muck things up again as many senior leaders  
believed they had done in Vietnam. If the press [was] not present,  
then there [was] no need to be concerned about . . . media spin.[85]  
  
Given such prevailing attitudes, it is small wonder that the staff  
officer who came up with the name Urgent Fury failed to consider the  
media's response to the nickname, much less use a name calculated to  
create a positive response to the event. That the media could be used to  
develop public support for operations was a notion foreign to many in  
the military at the time.  
  
\*Just Cause--or High Hokum?\*  
  
Just Cause was the first US combat operation since the Korean War whose  
nickname was designed to shape domestic and international perceptions  
about the mission it designated. And it is perhaps unsurprising that the  
man who helped formulate the name, Lieutenant General Kelly, held an  
undergraduate degree in journalism.[86] His background equipped him to  
appreciate what others could not: that naming an operation is tantamount  
to seizing the high ground in waging a public relations campaign. By  
declaring the Panama invasion a just cause, the nickname sought to  
contrast US motives with the injustices of the Noriega regime, which  
included election fraud, drug trafficking, harassment of US service  
members and their dependents, and the murder of a Marine officer. The  
gambit largely succeeded. The name, prominently mentioned in Pentagon  
press releases, was widely circulated by the media, which generally  
accepted the term without protest.  
  
Network news anchors adopted the phrase "Operation Just Cause" to  
refer to the invasion as if they had invented the phrase. In less  
than an hour after the Bush administration started using the phrase  
"Operation Just Cause," the network news anchors were asking  
questions like "How is Operation Just Cause going?"[87]  
  
At least two editorials adopted the phrase by way of endorsing the  
invasion.[88]  
  
Naming the operation Just Cause was risky, however, not only because it  
was an obvious public relations ploy, but also because it apparently  
sought to preempt judgment about whether, in fact, the invasion really  
was moral, legal, and righteous. Some saw this as overreaching. A /New  
York Times/ editorial entitled "Operation High Hokum" noted how  
different the nickname was from previous nonsense names and criticized  
it as an "overreach of sentiment."[89] Several years later, a more  
spirited critic wrote:  
  
It was an extremely cynical gambit to name a blatantly unjust  
invasion Operation Just Cause. It betrayed the administration's  
insecurity about an illegal invasion of a sovereign country. The  
label was, therefore, very important . . . in creating the  
impression among the general population that the US government was  
pursuing a morally righteous cause. [It was] blatant propaganda.[90]  
  
"Just Cause" illustrates both the power and the limits of nicknames in  
shaping perceptions about military operations. Few would object to the  
Defense Department engaging in what some have called "public  
diplomacy"[91]--the attempt to portray its activities in a positive  
light to bolster troop morale and to garner domestic and international  
support. Commercial firms carefully consider product names to ensure  
success in the marketplace; why should the government's approach to  
naming military operations be any different? But there is a point at  
which aggressive marketing turns public relations into propaganda. Going  
beyond this point breeds cynicism rather than support. Precisely where  
this point is may be ill-defined, but the nickname Just Cause probably  
came close to it.  
  
Operation Just Cause ushered in a new era in the nicknaming of US  
military operations, one in which operations are given names carefully  
selected to shape perceptions about them. To fully understand what  
spawned this new era, one must look beyond the immediate influence of  
Operation Just Cause. While the Panama invasion certainly helped  
military leaders recognize how powerful nicknames could be in shaping  
attitudes, two other important trends were at work.  
  
The first trend was the growing recognition among the military  
leadership that the media could be an ally rather than an opponent in  
the public relations effort. Articles arguing for cooperation with the  
media abound in professional military journals after 1989.[92] If  
nicknames were to contain a message, then the media would be a useful  
means of communicating it.  
  
The second trend was the growing relative importance of nicknames in  
relation to the shrinking scale of military action. During previous wars  
like Korea and Vietnam, individual operations were but a small piece of  
a much larger effort, so operation nicknames attracted relatively little  
attention. In recent times, when wars are fought with unprecedented  
speed and when circumscribed peacekeeping, humanitarian, and relief  
missions proliferate, a single operation usually encompasses the entire  
event. The Persian Gulf War is an exception, but even in that case the  
confrontation consisted of only two operations. Nicknames have become  
synonyms for entire conflicts; "Desert Storm," for example, is  
frequently used in place of "Gulf War."[93]  
  
\*Desert Shield to Sea Angel\*  
  
In August 1990, the Central Command (CENTCOM) staff expended  
considerable effort in selecting the best name for the operation  
designed to defend Saudi Arabia from Iraqi invasion. The fact that so  
much effort went into naming Desert Shield suggests the radical change  
in attitude which had occurred in the nine months since the invasion of  
Panama, when the transformation of the name Blue Spoon into Just Cause  
occurred as an afterthought shortly before the operation began. The  
naming of Operation Desert Shield and its successor, Desert Storm, also  
illustrates the critical role of artistry in the process.  
  
During the hectic days of planning the deployment to the Gulf, CENTCOM  
staff officers managed to compile a list of candidate nicknames three  
pages long,[94] from which General H. Norman Schwarzkopf initially  
selected the name Peninsula Shield. The first two letters of the first  
word, PE, are not assigned to CENTCOM, so it is clear that CENTCOM felt  
that selecting the right name was more important than sticking to its  
assigned alphabetic sequences. However, the JCS rejected the name,[95]  
perhaps because the mission called for defending only portions rather  
than the entirety of the Arabian Peninsula, or because "peninsula" was  
not thought to be characteristic enough of the region. Other names were  
considered, including Crescent Shield--a name intended to appeal to the  
Saudis and other Arab allies--but this too was rejected.[96] In the end,  
CENTCOM proposed and JCS accepted Desert Shield,[97] a name which  
suggested both the region's characteristic geography and CENTCOM's  
defensive mission.[98] The metaphor of the shield was well chosen  
because it emphasized not only US deterrence but also Iraqi aggression,  
for a shield is only necessary when a sword has been unsheathed. In the  
context of the metaphor, the deployment of US troops was necessary to  
deter an Iraqi sword that had already bloodied itself in Kuwait. Such  
careful and effective wordsmithing played well with domestic and  
international observers, setting a context conducive to garnering  
support for the operation.  
  
The naming of the offensive phase of the Gulf campaign was no less  
effective. Recognizing the success of the nickname Desert Shield,  
General Schwarzkopf played off the name in coming up with Desert  
Storm,[99] establishing a thematic linkage which would later be employed  
in subsequent and subordinate operations as well: the name of the ground  
offensive was Desert Saber; the redeployment was called Desert Farewell;  
the distribution of leftover food to the US poor was Desert Share. This  
family of operation names drew grudging admiration from /The Nation/:  
"You have to admire the Defense Department P.R. people who thought up  
the names for the various phases of the war, each carefully calibrated  
to send the correct propaganda message."[100] Characterizing the names  
as propaganda is a cynical label which could be applied to any  
government-sponsored public relations effort, but, for all its cynicism,  
the comment does suggest how successful CENTCOM's operation names were  
in developing public support for its various missions.  
  
General Schwarzkopf was probably inspired to use the storm metaphor by  
the name of the air operation, which Air Force planners had dubbed  
Instant Thunder.[101] The storm metaphor associated the offensive with  
the unleashing of overwhelming natural forces, an association which was  
as politically astute as it was inspirational, cloaking the military  
offensive in the garb of natural phenomena. When the long-awaited  
offensive began, General Schwarzkopf played upon the metaphor's  
inspirational power in his message to his troops: "You must be the  
thunder and lightning of Desert Storm," he told them.[102] The General's  
statement was widely publicized and admired; one writer commented that  
Schwarzkopf's rhetoric "sounded positively Churchillian."[103] Thus, the  
name served to inspire the nation as well as the troops.  
  
Not all post-Just Cause nicknames have been as successful as Desert  
Shield and Desert Storm. For example, the name for the US Marine  
operation to aid victims of the 1991 typhoon which devastated Bangladesh  
was originally Operation Productive Effort, a name that General Colin  
Powell admitted he never liked and which neither he nor his staff could  
remember. "After a day of struggling with Productive Effort, I said to  
my staff, `We've just got to get a better name.'" When the following  
day's newspaper reported that the Bangladeshis who saw the Marines  
coming in from the sea by helicopter and landing craft said, "Look!  
Look! Angels! From the sea!" the operation was rechristened Sea Angel.[104]  
  
\*Guidelines for Naming Operations\*  
  
The Productive Effort incident demonstrates that the military still has  
some learning to do about the art of naming operations. Rules for  
helping staff officers through the process would be of little value  
because nicknaming is an art rather than a science. Yet four general  
suggestions emerge from the last 45 years of nicknaming operations: make  
it meaningful, target the key audiences, be wary of fashions, and make  
it memorable. These suggestions and the prudent guidelines already  
published in DOD Regulation 5200.1-R may prevent another  
"(non)Productive Effort."  
  
/First, make it meaningful/. Don't waste a public relations opportunity,  
particularly where highly visible operations are involved. If the Gulf  
War has taught us anything, it has shown us how powerful words and  
images can be in shaping perceptions. But in the pursuit of a meaningful  
name, avoid those that border on the propagandistic. It is one thing to  
name an operation with a view to gaining public support first; it is  
quite another to put a label on an operation that insists upon its  
morality. However righteous an operation might appear to be, a name like  
Just Cause can be distasteful to the media and general public, not  
necessarily because they disagree with the justness of the cause, but  
because they resent having such words put (literally) in their mouths.  
The more prudent course is to find names that reinforce policy  
objectives by emphasizing the mission and its rationale. Such an  
approach is likely to satisfy all critics except those who view /any/  
government public relations effort as propaganda.  
  
/Second, identify and target the critical audiences/. While it has been  
pointed out that "in the global media environment, the information  
provided to one audience must be considered available to all  
audiences,"[105] it is seldom possible to effectively target all  
potential audiences using a two-word nickname. Thus, one must chose  
one's target carefully. The first impulse might be to consider only the  
morale of the troops and the support of the American public, but two  
other audiences should be considered as well: the international  
community, including allies and coalition partners; and the enemy.  
  
The importance of these audiences varies with the situation. Where an  
operation poses safety concerns to a foreign population, the operation  
name should be designed to allay those concerns. For example, the  
operation to remove chemical weapons from Europe was named Steel Box, "a  
solid, positive name" which "implied leakproof execution, thus  
reassuring our allies."[106] Where US forces operate with coalition  
partners or allies, the operation may benefit from a name that  
emphasizes solidarity. We routinely use such a strategy in naming  
combined exercises like Team Spirit, and we sometimes elect to downplay  
US participation by employing the language of the partner nations, like  
Fuertes Unitas (United Forces).  
  
In certain situations, even the enemy can be the critical audience,  
since operation and exercise names can send clear signals of US  
intentions. For example, Earnest Will was the name of the operation to  
escort reflagged oil tankers through the Persian Gulf, a name which  
conveyed to the Iranians the firmness of US resolve in defending the  
vessels. An amphibious exercise mounted before the Gulf War was dubbed  
Imminent Thunder, a name clearly designed to intimidate the Iraqis.  
  
/Third, be cautious of fashions/. Operation nicknames enjoy periods of  
popularity just like personal names. The current fashion in nicknaming  
operations is to make the names sound like mission statements by using a  
verb-noun sequence: Promote Liberty, Restore Hope, Uphold Democracy,  
Provide Promise. ("Provide" is the most popular verb, having been used  
in the names of six different operations during the 1989-1993  
period.[107]) There is value in this approach because it tends to keep  
the mission foremost in the minds of the troops executing it, and it  
reminds domestic and international audiences why the mission was  
undertaken. But there is also a certain formulaic monotony about such  
names which makes them less memorable than they might otherwise be. Like  
having a 1950s classroom full of Dicks and Janes, it's hard to tell the  
Provide Hopes and Comforts apart.  
  
/Finally, make it memorable/. To shape perceptions, nicknames must gain  
currency, something that can happen only if they cling to the cobwebs of  
the mind. This was one failing of the name Productive Effort; if the  
Joint Staff couldn't even remember it, how would it affect the general  
public? The name had three strikes against it: it lacked uniqueness (all  
operations are efforts, and one hopes that all are productive); it was  
abstract (what is a productive effort anyway?); and it was too long  
(five syllables).  
  
To avoid these failings, start by identifying unique attributes of the  
operation. Try to capture those characteristics in specific terms with a  
metaphor or with words that evoke an image. Try to keep each word to two  
syllables or less. Sea Angel, the name that replaced Productive Effort,  
has all the traits of a memorable name: it is unique and specific; it  
evokes a clear image in more than one culture; and it has only three  
syllables. Desert Shield and Desert Storm share those traits. It is no  
accident that the latter name is so frequently substituted for the name  
Gulf War. People remember it.  
  
Applying the four guidelines will result in an effectively nicknamed  
operation, an outcome that can help win the war of images. In that war,  
the operation name is the first--and quite possibly the decisive--bullet  
to be fired. Mold and aim it with care.  
  
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\*NOTES\*  
  
1. I have discarded the American typographic convention of capitalizing  
operation names in the their entirety on the assumption that this would  
be distracting in a paper full of such names. (As a general rule, it is  
likewise the typographic house style of /Parameters/ to capitalize only  
the first letter of operation names. In addition to being "distracting,"  
the practice of setting operation names in all capitals--while  
historically accurate--can be confusing, making them appear as acronyms.  
Our choice in this matter has been for clarity over strict historical  
accuracy, despite the objection of some of our historian advisors.--Editor)  
  
2. Bob Woodward, /The Commanders /(New York: Pocket Star Books, 1991),  
pp. 149-50.  
  
3. For a comprehensive listing of nicknamed operations over the  
five-year period starting in 1989, see Francis M. Doyle, Karen J. Lewis,  
and Leslie A. Williams, /Named Military Operations from January 1989 to  
December 1993/ (Fort Monroe, Va.: TRADOC Technical Library, 1994).  
Nicknames and code words are not the same. As noted later in this  
article, code words are assigned a classified meaning and are used to  
safeguard classified plans and operations, while nicknames are assigned  
unclassified meanings and are used for administrative, morale, and  
public information purposes.  
  
4. Charles W. McClain, Jr., and Garry D. Levin, "Public Affairs in  
America's 21st Century," /Military Review/, 74 (November 1994), 11.  
  
5. Ray Eldon Hiebert, "Public Relations as a Weapon of Modern Warfare,"  
in /Desert Storm and the Mass Media/, ed. Bradley S. Greenberg and  
Walter Gantz (Cresskill, N.J.: Hampton Press, 1993), p. 36.  
  
6. Barrie Pitt, /1918: The Last Act/ (New York: W. W. Norton, 1962), pp.  
47-50.  
  
7. Robert B. Asprey, /The German High Command at War: Hindenburg and  
Ludendorff Conduct World War I/ (New York: William Morrow, 1991), pp.  
340-41.  
  
8. Ibid., pp. 392-93.  
  
9. Memorandum from Dwight D. Eisenhower to the Adjutant General,  
Subject: Code Words to Designate Plans, Projects, Localities, etc., 10  
March 1942, National Archives Record Group Number 407, p. 1.  
  
10. Ray S. Cline, /United States Army in World War II: Vol. IV, The War  
Department: Part 2, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division/  
(Washington: GPO, 1951), p. 65, n. 59.  
  
11. Mark Skinner Watson, /United States Army in World War II: Vol. IV,  
The War Department: Part 1, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and  
Preparations/ (Washington: GPO, 1950), pp. 487-90.  
  
12. Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, /United States Army in World War  
II: Vol IV, The War Department: Part 3, Strategic Planning for Coalition  
Warfare, 1941-1942/ (Washington: GPO, 1953), p. 50, n. 67.  
  
13. Ibid., p. 103, n. 22.  
  
14. Bill Hines, "Operation CODENAME," /Infantry Journal/, March 1947, p.  
42.  
  
15. Ibid.; on the code-naming functions of the Inter-Services Security  
Board, see the following sources: Ewen Montagu,/Beyond Top Secret Ultra/  
(New York: Coward, McCann, and Geoghegan, 1978), p. 52; F. H. Hinsley  
and C. A. G. Simkins, /British Intelligence in the Second World War:  
Vol. IV, Security and Counter-Intelligence/ (New York: Cambridge Univ.  
Press), p. 247.  
  
16. Minutes of the Sixth JCS Meeting, 18 March 1942, p. 3; available on  
microfilm, /Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-45/ (Frederick,  
Md.: University Publications of America, 1983).  
  
17. Eisenhower.  
  
18. When the War Plans Division was renamed the Operations Division on  
23 March 1942, the newly reconstituted Current Section was assigned code  
management responsibilities, a function it performed for the duration of  
the war; see Ray S. Cline, /United States Army in World War II: Vol. IV,  
The War Department: Part 2, Washington Command Post: The Operations  
Division/ (Washington: GPO, 1951), pp. 106, 131.  
  
19. Hines, p. 42.  
  
20. Warren F. Kimball, ed., /Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete  
Correspondence: Vol. I, Alliance Emerging, October 1933-November 1942/  
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), p. 280; also /Vol. II,  
Alliance Forged, November 1942-February 1944/, pp. 491-92.  
  
21. Ibid.  
  
22. Winston S. Churchill, /The Second World War: Vol. V, Closing the  
Ring/ (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951), p. 662.  
  
23. Churchill, /The World Crisis: 1916-1918/ (New York: Scribners,  
1927), I, 279; also II, 125ff.  
  
24. Churchill, /Closing the Ring/, p. 662.  
  
25. Kimball, I, 280.  
  
26. Ibid.  
  
27. Michael Howard, /History of the Second World War: United Kingdom  
Military Series: Vol. IV, Grand Strategy, August 1942-September 1943/  
(London: HMSO, 1972), p. 430.  
  
28. Ibid.  
  
29. W. G. F. Jackson, /"Overlord": Normandy 1944/ (London:  
Davis-Poynter, 1978), p. 89; Omar N. Bradley, /A Soldier's Story/ (New  
York: Henry Holt, 1951), p. 172.  
  
30. Churchill may have sought an alternative to Roundhammer as much for  
security reasons as aesthetics. This name, in conjunction with the name  
of the planned invasion of southern France, dubbed Anvil, gave a pretty  
clear hint as to the Allies' hammer-and-anvil strategy. While the  
foregoing is my own speculation, it is known that Anvil was renamed  
Dragoon precisely because the Allies feared that "the enemy might  
finally light on the significance of the word." See Forrest C. Pogue,  
/George C. Marshall, Vol. II, Organizer of Victory/ (New York: Viking  
Press, 1973), p. 413.  
  
31. David Kahn, /The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing/ (New  
York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 503.  
  
32. Hines, p. 43.  
  
33. E. B. Potter, /Sea Power: A Naval History/ (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:  
Prentice-Hall, 1960), p. 777.  
  
34. Barton Whaley, /Codeword Barbarossa/ (Cambridge, Mass.:  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1973), p. 16, note.  
  
35. David Irving, /Hitler's War/ (New York: Viking Press, 1977), p. 142.  
  
36. Whaley, p. 18.  
  
37. Montagu, p. 53.  
  
38. The first World War II operation names were made public on 10  
October 1945, upon release of: US War Dept., General Staff, /Biennial  
Report of the Chief of the United States Army, July 1, 1943 to June 30,  
1945, to the Secretary of War/ (Washington: GPO, 1945). See "Code Names  
of Big Operations Revealed; Invasion of Kyushu Was to Be `Olympic,'"  
/The New York Times/, 10 October 1945, p. 13.  
  
39. US Dept. of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, /Department of Defense  
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms/ (Washington: GPO, 23 March  
1994), pp. 72, 261.  
  
40. David Sidney Shalett, "Test Atomic Bombs to Blast 100 Ships at  
Marshalls Atoll," /The New York Times/, 25 January 1946, p. 1.  
  
41. Jonathan M. Weisgall, /Operation Crossroads: The Atomic Tests at  
Bikini Atoll/ (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994), p. 32.  
  
42. See, for example, "Operation Crossroads," /The New York Times/  
/Magazine/, 17 February 1946, p. 8.  
  
43. Weisgall, p. 32.  
  
44. "Notes and Comment," /The New Yorker/, 27 July 1946, p. 12.  
  
45. D. Clayton James, /The Years of MacArthur: Vol. III, Triumph and  
Disaster, 1945-1964/ (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), p. 465.  
  
46. For example, the name Operation Chromite appeared in /Time/ only ten  
days after the landing took place. Because the name was meaningless, it  
received only passing attention. See "Battle of Korea," /Time/, 25  
September 1950, p. 26.  
  
47. Matthew B. Ridgway, /The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge/  
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), 85ff.  
  
48. For one Marine's reaction to the name Ripper, see Henry Berry, /Hey,  
Mac, Where Ya Been? Living Memories of the U.S. Marines in the Korean  
War/ (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), p. 209.  
  
49. Ridgway actually told reporters about Operation Killer before it  
commenced but requested that they not report the information until the  
attack had begun. See James F. Schnabel, /United States Army in the  
Korean War: Vol. III, Policy and Direction: The First Year/ (Washington:  
GPO, 1972), p. 340.  
  
50. Lindesay Parrott, "U.N. Units Advance More Than 8 Miles in Drive in  
Center," /The New York Times/, 22 February 1951, p. 1.  
  
51. Ibid.  
  
52. Berry, pp. 26, 209.  
  
53. Parrott; "Operation Killer," /The New York Times/, 25 February 1951,  
sec. IV, p. 1; Lindesay Parrott, "U.S. Forces Launch 2 Attacks on Reds;  
Main Push Goes On," /The New York Times/, 1 March 1951, p. 1; "Gen. Matt  
and Gen. Mud: Waterlogged Marines Join U.N.'s Operation Killer," /Life/,  
12 March 1951, p. 39. The writer of a letter published in /The New York  
Times/ noted that he had seen "frequent references in the newspapers,  
including /The Times/, to `Operation Killer'"; see Hugh Gallaher, letter  
to the editor, printed as "Military Designation Criticized," /The New  
York Times/, 6 March 1951, p. 26.  
  
54. The words are Ridgway's, paraphrasing Collins; see Ridgway, p. 110.  
  
55. Gallaher; Jacob Herzfeld, letter to the editor, 28 February 1951,  
printed as "Korea's Holocaust," /The New York Times/, 3 March 1951, p. 12.  
  
56. "Union Gains Cited by Harry Bridges," /The New York Times/, 3 April  
1951, p. 55.  
  
57. Ridgway, p. 110.  
  
58. Harry G. Summers, /Korean War Almanac/ (New York: Facts on File,  
1990), p. 156.  
  
59. Ridgway, p. 110.  
  
60. Ibid., p. 111.  
  
61. Gregory R. Clark, /Words of the Vietnam War: The Slang, Jargon,  
etc./ (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1990), p. 365.  
  
62. Ibid, pp. 369, 379.  
  
63. Shelby L. Stanton, /Anatomy of a Division: The 1st Cavalry in  
Vietnam /(Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1987), p. 70.  
  
64. Clark, p. 374.  
  
65. Daniel C. Hallin, /The "Uncensored War": The Media and Vietnam/ (New  
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986), p. 145; see also the series of stories  
in /The New York Times/ written by R. W. Apple, Jr., which appeared 28  
January (p. 12), 31 January (p. 12), 2 February (p. 15), and 3 February  
(p. 15) 1966.  
  
66. Stanton, p. 72.  
  
67. William C. Westmoreland, /A Soldier Reports/ (Garden City, N.Y.:  
Doubleday, 1976), p. 164.  
  
68. Ibid.; Stanton, p. 72.  
  
69. Westmoreland, p. 164.  
  
70. For a comprehensive listing of operation names used during the  
Vietnam War, see Clark, pp. 363-83.  
  
71. Westmoreland, p. 164.  
  
72. "DoD Information Security Program," DOD Directive 5200.1, 1 June  
1972; reprinted in /Federal Register/, 3 August 1972, Vol. 37, No. 150,  
pp. 15655-15686. The guidelines concerning nicknames which appear on  
page 15685 do not appear in the previous version of DOD Directive  
5200.1, entitled "Safeguarding Official Information in the Interests of  
the Defense of the United States," 8 July 1957; rpt. in US Dept. of  
Defense, /Implementation of Recommendations of Coolidge Committee on  
Classified Information/ (Washington: July 1957), Pt. 2, App. 4, Encl. 1,  
p. 1.  
  
73. The same guidelines appear in the newest version of this regulation:  
US Dept. of Defense, /Information Security Program Regulation/, 5200.1-R  
(Washington: June 1986), p. C-2.  
  
74. Ibid.  
  
75. Ibid., pp. C-1 to C-3.  
  
76. US Dept. of Defense, /Code Name, Nickname, and Exercise Term (NICKA)  
WWMCCS System: Project Manual/ (Washington: 20 February 1975), p. 1.  
  
77. US Dept. of Defense, /Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Reporting  
Structure: Vol. II, Joint Reports: Part 14, General Use/Miscellaneous:  
Chapter 4, Code Word, Nickname, and Exercise Term Report, Change 11/,  
JCS Pub 1-03.19 (Washington: 13 March 1990), p. 14-4-9.  
  
78. Ibid., p. 14-4-6.  
  
79. Ibid., pp. 14-4-14 and 14-4-16.  
  
80. The one exception to the poorly named operations of the period was  
Operation Eagle Claw, the effort to free US hostages held in Iran. But  
the name never gained currency because the mission was aborted. Instead,  
the mission has become known as the "Iranian hostage rescue attempt" or  
simply as Desert One, the designation of the staging area where the  
mission was scrubbed.  
  
81. David Hoffman and Fred Hiatt, "Weinberger Says U.S. May Stay for  
Weeks," /The Washington Post/, 4 November 1983, p. B2.  
  
82. Representative Byron raised this criticism in a congressional  
post-mortem of Urgent Fury when she questioned whether the military  
hadn't "[gone] to overkill" in the operation; see US Congress, House,  
Committee on the Armed Services, /Lessons Learned as a Result of the  
U.S. Military Operations in Grenada, Hearings/ (Washington: GPO, 1984),  
p. 45.  
  
83. William S. Lind, quoted in Robert J. Beck, /The Grenada Invasion:  
Politics, Law, and Foreign Policy Decisionmaking/ (Boulder, Colo.:  
Westview Press, 1993), p. 17.  
  
84. Jack Eisen, "`Lede of the Week' Award," /The Washington Post/, 4  
November 1983, p. B2.  
  
85. Marc D. Felman, /The Military/Media Clash and the New Principle of  
War: Media Spin/ (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Univ. Press, June 1993), p. 15.  
  
86. Hiebert, p. 32.  
  
87. Christina Jacqueline Johns and P. Ward Johnson, /State Crime, the  
Media, and the Invasion of Panama/ (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994), p. 64.  
  
88. See /Houston Post/ editorial, 21 December 1989; rpt. in /Editorials  
on File/ (16-31 December 1989), Vol. 20, No. 24, p. 1487; and /Daily  
Oklahoman/ editorial, 22 December 1989; rpt. in the same edition of  
/Editorials on File/, p. 1483.  
  
89. "Operation High Hokum," /The New York Times/, 23 December 1989, p. 30.  
  
90. Johns and Johnson, p. 64.  
  
91. Jonathan Alter et al., "The Propaganda War," /Newsweek/, 25 February  
1991, p. 38.  
  
92. See for example: McClain and Levin, pp. 6-15; Felman; Brent Baker,  
"Desert Shield/Storm: The War of Words and Images," /Naval War College  
Review/, 44 (Autumn 1991), 59-65; William M. Hammond, "The Army and  
Public Affairs: Enduring Principles," /Parameters/, 19 (June 1989), 57-74.  
  
93. A LEXIS/NEXIS word search of major newspapers and magazines for the  
three-year period January 1990 to December 1994 revealed that the name  
"Desert Storm" appeared in 8276 newspaper and 4466 magazine articles,  
while the name "Gulf War"--or a variant, like "Persian Gulf  
War"--appeared in 86,652 newspaper and 13,642 magazine articles. Clearly  
Gulf War and its variants are more popular than Desert Storm, but the  
frequency with which Desert Storm appears (roughly 10 percent of the  
newspaper citations and one-third of the magazine articles) is significant.  
  
94. "Military Makes Every Word Count, Picking Code Names, Like Desert  
Shield, A Matter of Pride," /Orlando Sentinel Tribune/, 19 August 1990,  
p. A17.  
  
95. H. Norman Schwarzkopf and Peter Petre, /It Doesn't Take a Hero/ (New  
York: Bantam Books, 1992), p. 309.  
  
96. Telephone conversation with Dr. Ronald Cole, Historian, Joint Office  
of History, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., 12  
January 1995.  
  
97. Like the first two letters of "peninsula," the first two letters of  
"desert" do not fall into the alphabetic sequences assigned to CENTCOM.  
  
98. Schwarzkopf, pp. 309-10.  
  
99. On the CINC's personal role in naming Desert Storm, see Schwarzkopf,  
p. 320.  
  
100. "Words of War," /The Nation/, 12 August 1991, p. 177.  
  
101. Instant Thunder was a deliberate allusion to Rolling Thunder, the  
name of the two-and-one-half-year bombing operation over North Vietnam,  
which many Air Force officers believed failed because of its gradual  
strategy. See Rick Atkinson, /Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian  
Gulf War/ (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1993), p. 59. Instant Thunder seems  
to be the first instance where a nickname purposefully (and critically)  
alluded to a previously named operation.  
  
102. Schwarzkopf, p. 413.  
  
103. Joshua Hammer et al., "You Must Be the Thunder and the Lightning,"  
/Newsweek/, 28 January 1991, p. 31.  
  
104. Donna Miles and Patrick Swan, "What's in a Name?" /Soldiers/,  
February 1992, p. 40.  
  
105. McClain and Levin, p. 11.  
  
106. Miles and Swan, p. 48.  
  
107. Doyle et al., p. 2.  
  
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